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Abstract 
This study provides a causal explanation and a statistical analysis of how corporate social 
capital promotes business performance of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
China.  The central argument of this study is that the formation and mobilization of 
corporate social capital are culturally and institutionally contextualized.  China is an 
exemplary case.  Through interviews and an analysis of 830 SMEs sampled in the Pearl 
River Delta Region of China, I will show how Chinese SME entrepreneurs formed and 
mobilized corporate social capital from multiplex and reciprocal strong ties to other 
entrepreneurs and non-economic organizations, and how such ties increased their 
business performance.  This study makes both theoretical and methodological 
contributions to social capital research.  Theoretically, I conceptualize guanxi, the 
Chinese expression of social connections, as an isotopic social capital, decompose guanxi 
to its analytical dimensions, and relate guanxi dimensions to business performance.  
Methodologically, I construct measures of guanxi ties among Chinese SME 
entrepreneurs, and for the first time in the long tradition of guanxi research I establish and 
assess counterfactual models in which to investigate the causal effect of guanxi-based 
social capital on business performance. 
  iv 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... vi	
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... vii	
Chapter 1 Introduction and Overview ................................................................................. 1	
1.1	 Research Question and Competing Theories ...................................................... 2	
1.2	 Overview of Chapters ......................................................................................... 4	
Chapter 2 Theories and Propositions .................................................................................. 8	
2.1	 Nonrelational perspective of business performance ........................................... 8	
2.2	 A relational perspective of business performance ............................................ 13	
2.2.1	 Definition and Benefits of Corporate Social Capital ................................ 14	
2.2.2	 Analytical Dimensions and Isotopes of Social Capital ............................. 16	
2.3	 Guanxi-based Corporate Social Capital ............................................................ 19	
2.3.1	 A Social-Network Definition of Chinese Guanxi ..................................... 19	
2.3.2	 Guanxi-based Corporate Social Capital: Theory and Propositions .......... 20	
Chapter 3 Data, Measurement, and Analytic Strategy ...................................................... 31	
3.1	 Data ................................................................................................................... 31	
3.2	 Measurement ..................................................................................................... 33	
3.2.1	 Performance .............................................................................................. 33	
3.2.2	 Measures of nonrelational explanations .................................................... 35	
3.2.3	 Measures of relational explanations .......................................................... 37	
3.2.4	 Control variables ....................................................................................... 43	
3.3	 Analytic strategy ............................................................................................... 46	
Chapter 4 Statistical Results from OLS Models ............................................................... 50	
4.1	 Baseline Model ................................................................................................. 50	
4.2	 Non-relational Hypotheses of Performance ...................................................... 53	
4.3	 Relational Hypotheses of Performance ............................................................. 55	
4.4	 Preliminary Conclusions ................................................................................... 61	
Chapter 5 Counterfactual Models ..................................................................................... 63	
5.1	 Concepts and Terminologies of Counterfactual Analysis ................................ 63	
5.2	 Testing Relational Hypotheses with Treatment Effect Models ........................ 67	
5.3	 Testing Relational Hypotheses with Doubly Robust Estimators ...................... 70	
5.4	 Testing Relational Hypotheses with Propensity-Weighted Data ...................... 71	
5.5	 Testing Relational Hypotheses with Propensity-Matched Data ....................... 73	
5.6	 Regression Diagnostics of Models with Propensity-Matched Data ................. 78	
5.6.1	 Diagnostics of particularism model .......................................................... 78	
5.6.2	 Diagnostics of multiplexity model ............................................................ 82	
5.6.3	 Diagnostics of obligation model ............................................................... 85	
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Discussions ........................................................................... 90	
Reference ........................................................................................................................ 101	
Appendix A Full Regression Tables in Chapter 5 .......................................................... 108	
Appendix B Simplified Mathematical Proofing of Doubly-robust Estimation (DRE) ... 112	
Appendix C Background Attributes of Enterprises and Entrepreneurs Used in Estimating 
Propensity Scores with Generalized Boosted Models .................................................... 114	
  v 
Appendix D Propensity-score Weighting Scheme ......................................................... 115	
Appendix E Summary Statistics of Propensity-score Weights ....................................... 116	
	
 	
  vi 
List of Tables 
Table 2–1 Three dimensions of corporate social capital and examples ............................ 30	
Table 3–1 Descriptive statistics for observed and  factor measurements of corporate 
performance .............................................................................................................. 34	
Table 3–2 Correlation coefficients and list-wise sample sizes of performance 
measurements ............................................................................................................ 35	
Table 3–3 Descriptive statistics of observed and factor measures for  nonrelational 
theories of business performance .............................................................................. 37	
Table 3–4 Descriptive statistics of measures for relational explanations of business 
performance .............................................................................................................. 43	
Table 3–5 Descriptive statistics of control variables ........................................................ 45	
Table 4–1 Baseline Model ................................................................................................ 52	
Table 4–2 Models of Non-relational Hypotheses of Performance ................................... 54	
Table 4–3 Models of Relational Hypotheses of Performance .......................................... 59	
Table 5–1 Treatment effect models for causal effects of three guanxi dimensions on SME 
performance index (see full table in Appendix A) .................................................... 69	
Table 5–2 Inverse-Probability-Weighted Regression Adjustment (IPWRA) models for 
causal effects of three guanxi dimensions on SME performance index (see full table 
in Appendix A) ......................................................................................................... 71	
Table 5–3 Propensity-score-weighted regression models for causal effects of three guanxi 
dimensions on SME performance index (see full table in Appendix A) .................. 72	
Table 5–4 Heterogeneity in attributes of entrepreneurs and enterprises before and after 
propensity matching for particularism ...................................................................... 75	
Table 5–5 Overall propensity-balancing test for particularism ........................................ 75	
Table 5–6 Heterogeneity in attributes of entrepreneurs and enterprises before and after 
propensity matching for multiplexity ........................................................................ 76	
Table 5–7 Overall propensity-balancing test for multiplexity .......................................... 76	
Table 5–8 Heterogeneity in attributes of entrepreneurs and enterprises before and after 
propensity matching for obligation ........................................................................... 77	
Table 5–9 Overall propensity-balancing test for obligation ............................................. 77	
Table 5–10 OLS regression models for causal effects of three guanxi dimensions on SME 
performance index using propensity-score-matched data (see full table in Appendix 
A) .............................................................................................................................. 78	
Table 5–11 OLS regression models with robust standard errors for causal effects of three 
guanxi dimensions on SME performance index using propensity-score-matched 




  vii 
List of Figures	
Figure 1–1 Competing theories and their relative efficiency in explaining the business 
performance of Chinese SMEs. .................................................................................. 4	
Figure 2–1 Competing theories and propositions in nonrelational and relational 
perspectives of business performance ......................................................................... 9	
Figure 3–1 Map of the Pearl River Delta (PRD) and sample size distribution in cities of 
Foshan, Zhongshan, and Jiangmen ........................................................................... 31	
Figure 4–1 Scatter plot, linear fit, 95% confidence interval of linear fit, quadratic fit, and 
LOWESS (bandwidth = 0.35) of performance index against particularism ............. 57	
Figure 4–2 Possible confounders and problems of making causal conclusions ............... 62	
Figure 5–1 Cook’s Plot and Influence Plot for observation with largest Cook’s distance 79	
Figure 5–2 Checking normality with cumulative and density distribution plots of 
studentized residuals ................................................................................................. 80	
Figure 5–3 Checking non-constant error variance (heteroscedasticity) ........................... 82	
Figure 5–4 Cook’s Plot and Influence Plot for observation with largest Cook’s distance 83	
Figure 5–5 Checking normality with cumulative and density distribution plots of 
studentized residuals ................................................................................................. 84	
Figure 5–6 Checking non-constant error variance (heteroscedasticity) ........................... 85	
Figure 5–7 Cook’s Plot and Influence Plot for observation with largest Cook’s distance 86	
Figure 5–8 Checking normality with cumulative and density distribution plots of 
studentized residuals ................................................................................................. 87	




  1 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Overview 
 
This study provides a causal explanation and a statistical analysis of how corporate social 
capital promotes business performance of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
China.  Corporate social capital is defined as “processes by which social actors create and 
mobilize their network connections within and between organizations to gain access to 
other actors’ resources” (Knoke, 1999, p. 18), and in Western countries these resources 
have been found to improve performance of enterprises (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & 
Tsai, 2004).  The central argument of this study is that the formation and mobilization of 
corporate social capital are culturally and institutionally contextualized.  China is an 
exemplary case.  Through in-depth interviews and an analysis of 830 SMEs sampled in 
the Pearl River Delta Region of China, I will show how Chinese SME entrepreneurs 
formed and mobilized corporate social capital from multiplex and reciprocal strong ties to 
other entrepreneurs and non-economic organizations, and how such ties increased their 
business performance.   
This study is designed to make both theoretical and methodological contributions to 
social capital research.  Theoretically, I conceptualize guanxi, the Chinese expression of 
social connections, as an isotopic social capital, decompose guanxi to its analytical 
dimensions, and relate guanxi dimensions to business performance.  Methodologically, I 
construct measures of guanxi ties among Chinese SME entrepreneurs, and for the first 
time in the long tradition of guanxi research I establish and assess counterfactual models 
in which to investigate the causal effect of guanxi-based social capital on business 
performance. 
This study is situated in the context of China’s on-going economic reforms.  Since 1978, 
China has achieved an average annual GDP growth rate of 9.8 percent.1  This long-term 
                                                
1 National Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjzs/tjsj/tjcb/dysj/201412/t20141231_662243.html).	
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and high-speed economic growth is powered by the prosperity of China’s rapidly 
expanding private sector, especially the mushrooming SMEs.  Starting at almost zero in 
1978, the number of privately owned businesses has been increasing continually.  Along 
with its constantly increasing numbers, the private sector is making more and more 
important contributions to China’s economy.  In terms of GDP share, private businesses 
contributed more than 60 percent of GDP in 2013.2  In regard to creating job 
opportunities, the private sector provided more than half of all urban jobs in 1995, and 
that fraction exceeded 70 percent in 2009.3  In terms of international trade, China became 
the largest exporting country in 2009 with total exports of $1.2 trillion,4 of which $0.48 
trillion4 came from private businesses. 
 
1.1  Research Question and Competing Theories 
 
How can we explain the business success of private enterprises in China?  What makes 
this issue more puzzling is the fact that “private-sector growth in China has taken place in 
an environment that is openly hostile to entrepreneurs and private businesses” (Tsai, 
2002).  It is true that China’s economic reform provides the institutional possibility for 
the emergence of private enterprises and stimulates entrepreneurship of Chinese people.  
However, the gradual nature of China’s reform from Mao’s redistributive system to 
Deng’s market economy generated a business environment that is drastically different 
from the free market defined by Western economists.  Some market sectors and 
transactions are still under the tight control of the government and giant state-owned 
enterprises, such as financial services, land and natural resources, energy, 
telecommunication, and international trade.  Codified and high-quality market 
                                                
2 People’s Daily (http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2013-02/03/nw.D110000renmrb_20130203_8-
01.htm).	
3 China Data Online (http://chinadataonline.org/).	
4 http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2011-02/08/c_13722111.htm.	
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information is still a very scarce resource and tends to be circulated among insiders rather 
than widely diffused across business networks (Martinsons & Westwood, 1997).  The 
level of general trust is still very low, and legal regulations of business behaviors are still 
difficult to enforce (Martinsons, 2008).  As a legacy of the central-planned economy of 
Mao’s era, local governments still embrace the idea of regional protectionism and direct 
interference in daily business operations (see Fan’s explanation of the Marketization 
Index 2007).  Facing this market economy with Chinese characteristics, how do private 
businesses, especially more-vulnerable SMEs, manage to survive and achieve 
performance in such a challenging environment? 
Four competing theories from two perspectives attempt to answer this challenging 
question.  As summarized in the left panel of Figure 1–1, two nonrelational theories, 
transaction cost theory and institutional theory, are widely adopted explanations of 
business performance in the management literature.  These nonrelational theories treat 
enterprises as open systems that are constantly adapting to external market and social 
environments.  The transaction cost theory relates performance to searching and 
monitoring costs of business transactions, which are largely determined by specific 
market environment in a given industry.  The institutional theory, however, puts more 
emphasis on how overall social, cultural, and institutional factors shape management 
practices and in turn determine performance.  No matter how many social factors are 
considered, these theories are still labeled as nonrelational mainly because of their 
assumptions that (1) entrepreneurs as Homo economicus make rational or bounded 
rational choices to reach optimal and suboptimal results; and (2) enterprises are open to 
business environment rather than embedded in concrete social relations. 
Compared to nonrelational theories, theories of the relational perspective (right-hand 
panel of Figure 1–1) accommodate business activities into concrete social connections.  
Relational theories emphasize the productive features of informal and grassroots social 
networks and social capital, and as a result they can provide more convincing 
explanations of the development of private businesses in China’s gradual economic 
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reform (Nee & Opper, 2012).  Fong and Chen (2007) provide support to the relational 
perspective by suggesting that in order to survive a hostile macroeconomic structure 
“entrepreneurs are more likely to obtain resources by using networks … [and] more 
likely to rely on [family/kinship ties] to obtain sensitive resources, such as those related 
to government contacts and funding resources.”   
This dissertation uses interviews and survey data of Chinese SMEs to examine relative 
merits of these competing theories and promotes the importance of understanding 
performance of Chinese SMEs via the relational perspective.   
 
Figure 1–1 Competing theories and their relative efficiency in explaining the business performance of 
Chinese SMEs.	
 
1.2  Overview of Chapters  
 
The remainder of this dissertation comprises five chapters.  The contents of each chapter 
are briefly summarized below.  
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Chapter 2 accomplishes two tasks – literature review and theory building.  This chapter 
starts with a brief review of nonrelational theories of business performance.  The core 
literature and empirical findings of transaction cost theory and institutional theory are 
reviewed in this order.  This review thus illustrates the increasing theoretical prominence 
of social and cultural reasons for business performance from one theory to another.  Two 
nonrelational propositions of business performance are developed, to situate this research 
in fields of management and organizational sociology.  This chapter next moves to 
reviews of social capital theories and studies of Chinese guanxi.  At the end of this 
chapter, I develop three theoretical propositions on the productive features of 
particularism, multiplexity, and obligations.  Each proposition is followed by an 
interview to vividly illustrate how particular and multifunctional strong ties with moral 
obligations of reciprocity generate productive advantages for Chinese SMEs.  
Chapter 3 describes survey data and statistical methods that I will use to examine the 
merits of competing propositions formulated in the previous chapter.  It begins with a 
description of the 2003 Pearl River Delta entrepreneur survey, sampling design, 
geographic distribution of samples, and overall quality of this survey data.  The chapter 
then continues to cover measures of dependent, independent, and control variables.  
Summary statistics and probability distributions of measures are discussed.  Some 
measures are derived from complex calculations, and the necessity of performing these 
calculations is justified.  Next, using these measures, propositions in Chapter 2 are 
operationalized into testable hypotheses.  Finally, this chapter outlines my modeling 
strategies and justifies the use of counterfactual models to solve the endogenous issue of 
guanxi measures.  
Chapter 4 examines nonrelational and relational hypotheses by using conventional OLS 
models.  These linear regression models assume parallel causality.  With this assumption, 
the independent variables of those hypotheses were treated as strictly exogenous reasons 
for business performance.  Regressions in Chapter 4 show that the institutional 
explanation of performance is supported by observed data while transaction cost theory is 
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not statistically significant (See solid and dashed arrows in Figure 1–1).  Results clearly 
suggest that from the nonrelational perspective of business performance, the explanation 
power of theories is positively related to their emphasis on social and cultural 
embeddedness.  Compared to theories that mainly focus on market and transaction-
related factors, institutional theory situates business behaviors into broader social and 
cultural institutions and as a result yields its superior explanation power.  Regression 
models also show significant, positive, and linear effects of the three relational measures.  
These results imply that from the relational perspective, corporate social capital based on 
entrepreneurs’ strong, multifunctional, and reciprocal social ties with their important 
business partners is better able to explain variations in performance than social capital 
derived from weak and function-specific social ties of instrumental rationality.  
Chapter 5 is the core analytic chapter of the dissertation and it demonstrates my 
methodological contributions.  Competing theories in both perspectives are tested in 
Chapter 4 using linear regression models that assume parallel causal effects on 
performance.  Like Mouw’s (2003) challenge of the causal effects of social capital, in this 
research effects of corporate social capital are not free from confoundedness.  
To solve this problem of causality, two model-based and two data-based counterfactual 
modeling strategies are conducted in Chapter 5 including model-based methods of 
treatment effect model and the doubly-robust estimator as well as data-based methods of 
propensity-score weighting and propensity-score matching.  Consistent results across 
model-based and data-based counterfactual methods confirm the causal conclusions that 
the effects of the three corporate social capital dimensions on performance are 
statistically significant and positive.  The findings imply that it is the corporate social 
capital derived from Chinese guanxi ties rather than Western-style weak ties that generate 
productive advantages and boosts the performance of SMEs.  Compared to the spurious 
results in Chapter 4, the conclusions from models in Chapter 5 are causal relations 
between social capital and performance.  To strengthen these causal conclusions, 
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regression diagnostic techniques (residual and outlier analyses) and minor adjustments 
were made to models using propensity score matched samples.  
Finally, Chapter 6 briefly summarizes the findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5, draws 
conclusions about the propositions of this study, and provides a discussion of the 
limitations and possible directions of future research. 
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Chapter 2 Theories and Propositions 
 
This chapter reviews competing theories in nonrelational and relational perspectives, and 
it is also used to formulate propositions of how guanxi-based corporate social capital 
promotes business performance in the Chinese context.  In particular, three real-world 
stories learned from in-depth interviews with Chinese entrepreneurs are described to give 
readers a first impression of how my propositions on guanxi-based corporate social 
capital is related to the performance of SMEs in the Chinese social context.  All 
propositions will be further examined using quantitative data in the following chapters.   
 
2.1 Nonrelational perspective of business performance 
The nonrelational perspective of performance treats business organizations as open 
systems that constantly and rationally adapt to external and impersonal environments 
(Ashmos & Huber, 1987).  Two influential theories in this perspective are transaction 
cost theory and institutional theory.  The left-hand panel of Figure 2–1 organizes these 
two theories in an ascending order of their theoretical foci on social, cultural, and 
institutional factors.  
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Figure 2–1 Competing theories and propositions in nonrelational and relational perspectives of 
business performance 
 
Transaction Cost Theory 
Performance is a result of lower transaction cost.  Transactions are economic exchanges 
across organizations’ technical boundaries.  A transaction is free from cost if it is free to 
obtain transaction-related information, reach mutually acceptable contracts, and control 
opportunistic behaviors (Dahlman, 1979).  In reality, however, market transactions are 
costly, and some transactions are more costly than others, due to costs of information 
searching (Smith, Venkatraman, & Dholakia, 1999), repeated bargaining, and “human 
nature as we know it” (Williamson, 1981).  Given great complexity and uncertainty of the 
modern business environment, costs of searching, contracting, and monitoring complex 
business activities are considerably high. As a result, better performance comes from 
effectively controlled transaction costs.  
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In China all three components of transaction cost tend to be very high.  First, timely and 
accurate market information is largely not accessible to the general public.  Even if 
market information can be obtained, it tends to be less reliable, highly contextual, and 
usually uncodified. Thus, such market information requires significant amount of 
manpower, rather than an automatic and computer-based management information 
system (MIS), to filter and synthesize (Martinsons & Westwood, 1997).  Second, due to 
the lack of timely and accurate market information such as averaged market price for a 
product, averaged delivery time, and availability of various payment options, it is very 
challenging to reduce time and financial cost of repeated bargaining before any mutually 
agreed contracts can be reached.  Third, the cost of monitoring opportunistic behaviors is 
particularly high.  China is a low-trust society; universal trust toward general others 
remains low in China (Fukuyama, 1995).  As a result, the perceived risk of opportunism 
tends to be very high.  What makes transactions even more institutionally risky is the fact 
that in China’s less-mature market economy entrepreneurs have to face the lack of 
enforceable rules and legal regulations that are clear, universal, and fair (Martinsons, 
2008).  Given these two situations, a high cost of monitoring business transactions can be 
expected. 
For vulnerable SMEs, high transaction cost and impact of opportunistic behaviors are 
usually not affordable, and it is very unlikely for an individual SME to solve this problem 
alone.  To lower information and contracting cost collectively, grass root trade 
associations and local governments provide marketing services, including large-scale 
exhibitions in big cities and small-scale business fairs in local towns.  To jointly control 
opportunism, trade associations and local governments advocate business ethics within 
industries and improve legal services within local jurisdictions. Effectiveness of these 
collective solutions, however, varies from enterprise to enterprise.  Nonrelational 
Proposition 1 (NP-1):  Transaction cost explains business performance of Chinese 
SMEs.  SMEs have higher performance if they can effectively control cost of 
information searching, contracting, and monitoring by utilizing services and 
regulations of trade associations and local governments.  
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Institutional Theory 
Performance is a result of institutionalization.  Comparing to transaction cost theory, 
institutional theory focuses more heavily on social, cultural, and institutional factors in its 
explanations of business performance.  Institutional theory incorporates “cultural-
cognitive, normative and regulative” (Scott, 2005) factors of social institutions into 
explanations of performance.  Due to different conceptualizations of institutionalization, 
many institutional theories coexist (Alrich, 2006; Scott, 1987, 2004, 2005).  In a review 
piece, Scott (1987) identifies four definitions of institutionalization:  institutionalization 
as a “process of instilling value” (the institutionalization process attaches meanings and 
values to organizational interactions), institutionalization as a “process of creating 
reality” (social realities and social orders are constructed via human interactions), 
institutionalization as a process of defusing a “shared belief system” (commonly accepted 
cultures, symbols, and norms explain organizational behaviors), and institutionalization 
as a process of generating a “distinct societal sphere” (institutionalization attaches 
different ethics and behavioral expectations to each social sphere).  Despite the 
disagreement in definitions of institutionalization, all institutional theories emphasize that 
it is the shared rules, norms, as well as social meaning and behavioral habitus that jointly 
shape organizations’ structures and business strategies, which in turn determine business 
performance.   
China’s rapid economic reform has been coupled with slow progress in political reform.  
As a result, communist ideology and the socialist political system are still the most 
important institutional factors that affect social and economic behaviors in China.  In the 
latest 2004 Constitution of People’s Republic of China, it is easy to find Marxist ideology 
of class society and class struggle.  For example, Article I of the Constitution states that 
“the People’s Republic of China is a socialist state under the people’s democratic 
dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.  
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The socialist system is the basic system of the People’s Republic of China.”5 Combining 
Marxist doctrines with Chinese realities, a political system of Chinese-style socialism 
remains the basis of legitimacy on which the Communist Party of China rules political, 
social, and economic lives in China.  To show the critical importance of this political 
system, following the definition of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” President Hu 
Jintao’s “Speech At A Meeting Commemorating The 90th Anniversary Of The Founding 
Of The Communist Party Of China (July 1, 2009)” deserves a full quotation:  
The path of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the only way for China to achieve 
socialist modernization and create decent lives for its people. In taking the path of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics, we should, under the leadership of the CPC [Communist Party 
of China] and bearing China’s basic national conditions in mind, pursue economic 
development as the central task, uphold the Four Cardinal Principles6, be committed to the 
reform and opening up policy, free and develop the productive forces, strengthen and 
improve the socialist system, promote the socialist market economy, socialist democracy, 
an advanced socialist culture, and a harmonious socialist society, and make China a 
prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist 
country.7 
In such an institutional climate, actively internalizing the mainstream ideology and 
dominating political system into daily business operations generates the advantage of 
institutional legitimacy for the existence and development of privately owned businesses.  
Nonrelational Proposition 2 (NP-2):  Institutional legitimacy explains performance.  
Chinese SMEs that actively internalize mainstream ideology and political 
institutions, such as establishing Chinese Communist Party branches (showing 
support for the party’s leadership and the Four Cardinal Principles), unions 
(showing support for the socialist market economy and the leadership of the 
                                                
5 http://e-chaupak.net/database/chicon/2004/2004.pdf	
6 “Upholding the Four Cardinal Principles” summarizes Deng Xiaoping’s speech at a forum on the 
principles for the Party’s theoretical work on March 30, 1979: “1. We must keep to the socialist road.  2. 
We must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat.  3. We must uphold the leadership of the Communist 
Party.  4. We must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.” 
(http://en.people.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1290.html) 
7 Official translation of President Hu Jintao’s speech 
(http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90785/7426751.html). 	
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working class), and the institution of workers’ congress (showing support for the 
socialist democracy, socialist culture, and harmonious socialist society), obtain 
higher institutional legitimacy and tend to perform better.  
 
2.2 A relational perspective of business performance* 
Continuously rising labor cost and fast improvement of information technologies 
drastically expanded business organizations of all sizes in industrialized and post 
industrialized economies since the late 1990s.  Scott summarizes this evolution as blurred 
organizational boundaries, increasing practices of outsourcing, and decentralized power 
structure.  All these new trends, Scott argues, call for “a relational … conception of 
organizations” (2004, p. 13).  Similarly, Hwang (2001) advocates a relational perspective 
emphasizing “person-in-relations” and “persons-in-relation” as a theoretical paradigm 
and a methodological foundation for understanding organizational behaviors. 
In this research, a relational perspective refers to a theoretical approach that emphasizes 
the social embeddedness of business behaviors and promotes social capital explanations 
of business performance.  Social capital theories from the relational perspective provide 
sociological explanations of business activities in which social relations are basic 
analytical units, and characteristics of social relations are modeled as immediate reasons 
for economic outcomes.  This perspective originates in the idea that economic activities 
are embedded in concrete social relations and social contexts (Granovetter, 1985), which 
is theoretically significant for contemporary sociological understanding of economic 
activities (Emirbayer, 1997).   
A major significance of social capital theories of business performance comes from its 
critiques and improvements of the nonrelational perspective.  Transaction cost theory 
                                                
* This section is a revision of my forthcoming book chapter “Guanxi-based Corporate Social Capital and 
Chinese Entrepreneurship” in Jenn-Hwan Wang (ed.) Rethinking Social Capital and Entrepreneurship in 
Greater China, Routledge. 
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carries a Homo economicus assumption and leads to an under-socialized point of view of 
organizational behaviors by treating enterprises and entrepreneurs as completely 
independent from their concrete social connections and meaningful social contexts.  
While institutional theory, on another extreme, carries an over-socialized point of view 
and deprives people of their free will and their capability to enact social contexts and 
alter institutions.  A relational perspective emphasizes the power of active social 
embeddedness and corrects the logical imperfections of under- and over-socialized 
explanations of business performance.  
This section starts with definitions of social capital.  It then moves to reviews of 
productive features of weak-tie-based corporate social capital in Western societies.  
Finally, I conclude this section with a theoretical decomposition of the concept of social 
capital, which is used as a logical starting point for my theory building of guanxi-based 
corporate social capital.  
 
2.2.1 Definition and Benefits of Corporate Social Capital 
Social capital refers to productive benefits (Coleman, 1988, 1990) derived from 
structures and resources in networks (Baker, 1990, 2000; Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992; 
Lin, 2001a, 2001b) composed of durable interpersonal connections (Granovetter, 1985) 
and membership affiliations (Putnam, 2000). Following the idea of network-embedded 
economic activities (Granovetter, 1985, 1992; Moran, 2005), in this research I define 
corporate social capital of SMEs as productive benefits that are derived from 
entrepreneurs’ personal social networks and facilitate business performance. Productive 
benefits of corporate social capital include (1) information sharing and resource 
mobilization and (2) trust, shared norms, and commitment. 
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Information sharing and resource mobilization 
Social capital theory predicts that social ties linking a focal entrepreneur to his/her 
resourceful peers act as “channels or conduits through which ‘market stuff’ flows” 
(Podolny, 2001, p. 33). The “market stuff” refers to any business-related information and 
resource, yet not all social ties are equally effective to channel “market stuff”. A widely 
accepted theoretical prediction is that weak ties connecting heterogeneous network 
members are more capable of sharing diversified information and resources (Granovetter, 
1973). In addition to being channels, weak ties bridging structural holes generate a 
structural advantage to better synthesize information and control resource flows, which 
further promotes productivity (Burt, 2005).  
Empirical studies in Western societies largely confirm the power of weak ties. First, 
studies on information sharing show that weak ties provide cost-effective channels for 
diffusing highly diversified knowledge across organizational borders in both domestic 
(Bouty, 2000; Walter, Lechner, & Kellermanns, 2007) and international (Presutti, Boari, 
& Fratocchi, 2007) markets. A recent meta-analysis of 258 research articles on 
knowledge transfer of small organizations (Macpherson & Holt, 2007) again confirms 
information benefits of weak ties. Second, weak ties also connect focal entrepreneurs to 
actors in formal capital markets, such as commercial banks (Uzzi, 1999), venture capital 
firms and investment banks (Gulati & Higgins, 2003), and seed investors (Shane & 
Cable, 2002), and to members in informal friendship networks (e.g., Bates, 1997) to 
extract financial resources. Third, among all weak ties, a special kind of weak ties that 
bridges network structural holes not only channel more diversified resources (e.g., Burt, 
2004; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005) but also provide tie holders with stronger bargaining power, 
more choices to manipulate resource flows, more effective ways to reinforce strategic 
alliances, and as a result better business performance (Mizruchi & Glaskiewicz, 1993; 
Powell, Koput, Smith-Doerr, & Owen-Smith, 1999). 
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Trust, shared norms, and commitment. 
Weak ties not only transfer information and resources but also carry social values, such 
as trust, norms, and commitment to long-term interactions. These social values gradually 
attach to social ties via repeated economic interactions and stable membership (Bourdieu, 
1986) and lubricate resource flows (Moran, 2005). First, trust attached to social ties 
secures economic transactions by reducing opportunistic behaviors and unforeseeable 
uncertainties (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981), and trust self-reinforces during repeated 
interactions (Buskens & Weesie, 2000). As a critical component of social capital 
(Putnam, 1993, 2000), trust makes social capital an effective governance structure for 
controlling moral risks and transaction cost (Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994; Provan & 
Kenis, 2008; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992).  
Next, business norms diffusing across social ties generate solidarity, smooth 
coordination, and a public good of “value-based business integration” that benefits all 
network members (Cousins, Handfield, Lawson, & Petersen, 2006). Research 
demonstrates some important norms diffusing through social networks, such as common 
goals and mutual interests, community responsibility (Grangsjo & Gummesson, 2006), 
willingness to collaborate (Rottman, 2008), and moral expectations of acceptable 
business behaviors (Biggart & Castanias, 2001). Among all norms, social capital 
particularly emphasizes commitment to long-term and stable social connections among 
business actors. Strong commitments lower the cost of buyers (Krause, Handfield, & 
Tyler, 2007), increase the market reputation of suppliers (X. Luo, Griffith, Liu, & Shi, 
2004), and foster reciprocity in future transactions (Carney, 2005).  
 
2.2.2 Analytical Dimensions and Isotopes of Social Capital 
As reviewed above, findings in Western societies largely confirm that corporate social 
capital derived from weak ties promotes business performance. This theory is labeled as 
  17 
“weak-tie-based corporate social capital theory” in this research. Is weak-tie theory the 
only workable explanation of business performance in the relational perspective? Is 
establishing weak ties a universally effective solution to exert the productive power of 
social capital for all kinds of businesses across time and geographic locations?  
My answer is “No” because empirical counterexamples have already shown that validity 
of weak-tie theory is conditional. For example, recent research has already questioned the 
validity of weak-tie theory by demonstrating the contingent efficiency of weak ties at 
different developing stages of companies (timing contingency) (Maurer & Ebers, 2006), 
for companies of different ownership and size (demographic contingency) (Peng & Luo, 
2000), in economies with different levels of marketization (environmental contingency) 
(Batjargal, 2003; Martinsons, 2008), and so on (see Adler & Kwon, 2002 for other 
contingencies). In addition to these challenges, Confucian traditions of strong-tie 
preference, personal- and situational-specific moral standards, and the reluctance to take 
advantage of network members via brokering ties has already been identified as a 
cultural contingency of the weak-tie theory that cannot be ignored (Bian, 1997, 2008; 
Burt, Hogarth, & Michaud, 2000; Xiao & Tsui, 2007). 
Theoretical contingencies lead to an inspiring question: Is weak-tie theory just one 
special case of all possible social capital theories? An analytical decomposition of the 
concept of social capital is the first step to answer this theoretical question.  
Social capital “clearly is not a unidimensional concept” (Putnam, 1995, p. 76); this 
concept contains at least three analytical dimensions: relational dimension, structural 
dimension, and moral dimension (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). The relational dimension 
of social capital comes from the idea of “relational embeddedness” (Granovetter, 1992) 
and refers to the concrete and ongoing content of social ties, such as levels of “being 
particular,” levels of trust and trustworthiness, and other emotional attachments. Tie 
strength is a direct measurement of this dimension. Strong relations are so mutually 
particular that they are more powerful in mobilizing resources and influence and are less 
likely to decay. In contrast, weak relations are less mutually particular, less irreplaceable, 
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more likely to decay, but have the power to connect more diversified contacts. The 
structural dimension of social capital is rooted in the idea of “structural embeddedness” 
(Granovetter, 1992) and refers to impersonal network structures that can be measured by 
tie simplexity vs. tie multiplexity. A social tie is simplex if it carries only one function or 
fulfills only one purpose; a social tie is multiplex if it carries multiple functions 
(Coleman, 1988; Shipilov & Li, 2014).  The origin of the moral dimension of social 
capital can be traced back to Bourdieu’s observation on the durable obligations of 
network members that entitle them to credit “the collectivity-owned capital” (1986, p. 
249). The variation in feeling obliged to provide resources to network members is a direct 
measure of this dimension. Some networks have stronger culture of reciprocity and 
members in such networks are subjected to a socially coercive power to be reciprocal. 
Other networks do not carry such a culture; reciprocal behaviors in these networks are 
largely optional and usually based on rational calculations of investments vs. gains.  
Different combinations of these three dimensions generate social capitals based on 
different network configurations (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) and bring different 
benefits. In this research I push this idea one step further to define isotopes of social 
capital in the following way: 
Social capitals with different dimensional configurations are isotopes of 
each other if they fulfill the same set of functions.  
Theories relating isotopic social capitals to a given outcome are competing social capital 
theories in the relational perspective. These theories share one identical proposition: 
social networks are productive. These theories differ in predictions of “which social 
networks are more productive in what context.” For example, weak-tie-based corporate 
social capital has a configuration of low particularism, simplexity, and low obligations, 
and weak-tie theory explains the business performance of some enterprises in Western 
societies. In China’s cultural context, guanxi-based corporate social capital has a 
configuration of high particularism, multiplexity, and strong obligations, and it fulfills the 
same business functions in China as weak ties do in the West.  
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Therefore guanxi-based corporate social capital and weak-tie-based corporate social 
capital are isotopes, and a theory of how guanxi facilitates business performance in China 
competes directly with weak-tie theory. In the second half of this chapter, I will elaborate 
a theoretical framework to show how guanxi-based corporate social capital acts as an 
isotope of weak-tie-based corporate social capital in a Chinese context by using interview 
stories as supportive materials. 
 
2.3 Guanxi-based Corporate Social Capital 
This section elaborates a theoretical framework containing three propositions to show 
how guanxi-based corporate social capital (lower-right panel of Figure 2–1) acts as an 
isotope of weak-tie-based corporate social capital in the Chinese context.  When 
articulating propositions, I include three interview stories as supportive materials to show 
how each dimension of guanxi-based corporate social capital promotes performance.  
 
2.3.1 A Social-Network Definition of Chinese Guanxi  
The term “guanxi” is a cultural concept that is commonly used in Chinese everyday 
language; its meaning is similar to “relationships” or “connections” in English.8  
However, the exact meaning of guanxi cannot “adequately be expressed by an English-
language equivalent of one word, the concept is too culture specific” (Parnell, 2005, p. 
35).  To incorporate this cultural concept into the discourse of social capital theories, a 
guanxi tie is defined as a particular instrumental tie (Hwang, 1987, 2001; Walder, 1986; 
                                                
8 In the Chinese grammatical system there is no difference between plural and singular forms of a 
countable noun.  As a countable noun, guanxi can refer to “a connection” or “a set of connections” 
depending on context.  This linguistic difference between Chinese and English further increases the 
difficulty of translation.  In this chapter I use “a guanxi tie” to refer to “one/a connection” or “one/a tie” and 
“guanxi” as a plurale tantum noun that refers to “connections” or “ties.” 	
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Yang, 1994) or “a dyadic, particular and sentimental tie that has potential of facilitating 
favor exchanges between the parties connected by the tie” (Bian, 2006, p. 312).  
Several key words in Bian’s definition of guanxi deserve a closer look.  First, guanxi ties 
in either situation are “mutually special and beneficial for both parties” (Bian & Zhang, 
2014, p. 424).  In China, strong ties among family members and relatives are culturally 
defined as particular ties.  In addition, nonkin weak ties also have the potential to become 
strong pseudokin ties if both parties decide to conduct frequent and long-term 
interactions, during which kinlike sentiments accumulate.  Next, various interpersonal 
sentiments are crucial components of guanxi, such as personal face (mianzi), personal 
feeling (renqing), and personal attachment (ganqing) (Hwang, 1987; Kipnis, 1997; Lee & 
Dawes, 2005). The accumulation of those sentiments continuously increases the level of 
“being particular” over time.   
Lastly, guanxi ties are used to channel favors, which refers to “substantial help that 
produces decisive outcome or influence on others to get things done” (Bian & Zhang, 
2014, p. 425).  In Chinese culture, favors are an extremely valuable resource that can be 
exchanged exclusively through guanxi ties in a reciprocal manner.  In this research, 
favors observed in interviews include interest-free borrowing, insider-only market 
information and business opportunities, exclusive technical know-hows, franchised 
marketing channels, highly discounted logistic services, and government purchases.  In 
addition to resource diversity, favor exchanges are also reciprocal by nature⎯favor 
receivers carry their moral obligations and psychological pressure to repay favor granters, 
and granters expect obligated favor paybacks from receivers in the future (A. Y. King, 
1985, 1994).  
2.3.2 Guanxi-based Corporate Social Capital: Theory and Propositions 
I define guanxi-based corporate social capital as productive benefits derived from 
entrepreneurs’ guanxi ties that facilitate business performance. As an isotope of weak-tie 
corporate social capital, guanxi-based corporate social capital fulfills functions of 
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information/resource sharing and moral value injections in China. Empirical studies show 
that Chinese guanxi-based corporate social capital acts as conduits of information and 
resource flows (Parnell, 2005), which are crucial to business performance (Y. Luo & 
Chen, 1997). At the same time, guanxi-based corporate social capital promotes trust 
among kin and pseudokin network members, defuses shared norms of proper behaviors, 
and generates commitment to long-term reciprocal obligations (Bu, 2003; Cheng, 1995; 
Li & Liang, 2002; Wang & Liu, 2002). Empirical studies also show that these productive 
benefits cannot be effectively fulfilled by Western-style weak-tie-based corporate capital 
(Carlisle & Flynn, 2005; Standifird & Marshall, 2000).  
 
Particularism 
High particularism differentiates guanxi-based corporate social capital from weak-tie-
based corporate social capital in the relational dimension of social capital. Guanxi ties 
meet the definition of ties that are strong in “emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual 
confiding), and the reciprocal services” (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1361).  But the term 
“strong tie” cannot fully capture the particular nature of guanxi ties because guanxi is 
more complicated in its social meanings and much richer in functions than Westerners’ 
understanding of strong ties. 
First, guanxi ties are strong ties connecting egos to diversified network members and 
resources. In Western societies, the term “strong ties” refers to kinship ties among family 
members and relatives. As a result, the attributes of network members tend to be 
homophilous. Guanxi ties are strong but contain not only relatives but also a large 
number of pseudokin members. Pseudokin is a unique aspect in China, which is theorized 
as the “differential mode of association” (cha xu ge ju) (Fei, 1992). Guanxi represents a 
special type of strong ties that gradually emerge from actively attaching kinlike 
sentiment, intimacy, and various moral expectations to nonblood relationships so that 
social distance between two parties can be significantly shortened. In China pseudokin 
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ties usually include ties among classmates (people socialized together in the same 
environment from childhood to early adulthood), laoxiang (people born and/or raised up 
in the same geographic area and share the same cultural identities and collective 
memories), comrades-in-army (people who share the same collective memories of harsh 
conditions or even life-or-death experiences), and patron-client relationships in the 
workplace (traditional Confucian ideology expects the leader-subordinate or teacher-
student relation to follow similar moral standards that govern father-son and king-subject 
relations). The exclusive nature of favors requires a certain level of particularism as a 
precondition of initiating exchanges. Guanxi network has a tendency to continuously 
transform more and more heterogeneous network members into pseudokin members so 
that the exchanging insider-only favors for diversified needs can be achieved. As a result, 
the process of “pseudokinization” that enables subsequent flows of favors eventually 
leads to an expanding inner circle of one’s guanxi network to include resourcefully 
diversified contacts. In this sense, the Western definition of “strong tie” only captures ties 
between relatives in a guanxi network and ignores pseudokin ties.  
Second, guanxi generates person-specific moral standards. The differential mode of 
association, as a value system, prevents Chinese from establishing a universal moral 
standard (especially general trust) that is applicable to general others. Instead, Chinese 
people have different norms to treat people of different social distances, whose slight and 
subtle difference is very important for Chinese people to follow different moral 
standards. For example, taking advantage of core network members cannot be tolerated 
and will result in severe social sanctions, while playing opportunistic tricks on network 
outsiders is sometimes perceived as a clever move for the collective interests of insiders. 
As a result, higher levels of particularism in China lead to stronger person-specific trust 
and trustworthiness, which can later be used to facilitate business transactions. At the 
same time, the lack of particularism brings higher moral risks in business transactions and 
harms performance.  
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The particularism of guanxi demonstrates the power of strong ties in China. This feature 
of guanxi ties contradicts the theoretical predictions of weak ties (Burt, 2005; 
Granovetter, 1973). The ultimate reason for disagreement of this pair of competing 
theories is the resource exchangeability. The power of weak ties is a true prediction only 
when resources are exchangeable across network boundaries. If this precondition is not 
true, strong ties will become the only solution for mobilizing insider-only resources. Take 
information as an example. In the West, codified information can be transferred through 
strong and weak ties. Compared to strong-tie contacts in western contexts, weak-tie 
contacts are more heterogeneous and therefore are more capable of providing diversified 
information. This is the power of weak-ties. In contrast, codified and reliable information 
is very rare in China’s public domain (Martinsons, 2008). Instead, high-quality 
information that is timely, reliable, and accurate is isolated in inner circles of networks, 
and circulations of such productive information is considered as favor exchanges, which 
can only be achieved via guanxi ties. 
Relational Proposition 1 (RP-1):  In China, high level of particularism facilitates 
business performance because such relational advantage provides guanxi network 
insiders with (1) the capability of mobilizing members-only favors of high-quality 
resources and information that can substantially fulfill diversified instrumental 
needs; (2) a high level of trust and trustworthiness guaranteed by kinlike sentiment 
in guanxi ties.  
Story of Mr. Wu 
Mr. Wu, a forty-seven-year old in 2002, was previously a farmer in the rural outskirts of town D. 
He had only a primary school education. In 1982 he established a small furniture workshop in his 
hometown D. Although Mr. Wu grew up in a rural area, he had a strong global vision even at the 
early stages of his business. After twenty years of promoting traditional Chinese rosewood 
furniture overseas, Mr. Wu’s company expanded from a tiny backyard workshop to a 20,000 
square-meter R&D and manufacturing compound with more than 500 employees. By 2002 Mr. 
Wu’s company had become the leading competitor in the local rosewood furniture industry in 
town D. With over 180 different designs in five production lines, Mr. Wu earned an outstanding 
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reputation in the overseas luxury furniture markets in the United States, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.  
In 1982 when opening and reforming policies took effect in town D, Mr. Wu decided to start his 
own business. At that time the initial funds of around four thousand RMB Yuan represented a 
huge amount of money for an ordinary rural family. Almost all of his initial investments came 
from his brothers and sisters, particularly his close relatives in Hong Kong who had enough 
money to invest and strong incentive to help relatives who were fighting against poverty. The 
money Mr. Wu obtained from relatives in Hong Kong carried no interest and there was no 
repayment date. Both Mr. Wu and his relatives in Hong Kong treated the investment funds as 
family support with strong kinship sentiment rather than a for-profit investment.  
In addition to these initial investments, guanxi with relatives and close friends in town D also 
provided Mr. Wu with skilled labor. In the early stages of Mr. Wu’s business, none of the workers 
had experience in organizing and running a small family-owned furniture workshop. A strong 
feeling of belonging and a shared vision to significantly improve family living standards generated 
a persistently high level of work incentives. In this learning-by-doing stage, the workers in Mr. 
Wu’s small factory worked like a family and eventually overcame difficulties in product design, 
manufacturing, and marketing.  
Years later, some of these founding members left Wu’s company and started their own businesses 
in various industries. Starting their own businesses did not cut their strong ties with Mr. Wu. 
Instead, these founding members became crucial in the later developmental stages of Mr. Wu’s 
company. First, these strong ties guaranteed frequent face-to-face communication, which provided 
Mr. Wu with up-to-date, diversified, and trustworthy insider-only information about good ideas 
for production designs, latest market demands, new business orders, and so on. Second, during the 
expansion of their own businesses these founding members also established new network ties and 
then bridged Mr. Wu to their new friends with more diversified resources. At one point Mr. Wu 
faced an unexpected shortage of diesel fuel for his machines and did not have enough cash to buy 
fuel from the market. One of the founding members knew of Wu’s difficulty and quickly 
introduced Wu to a factory owner in his new network who happened to have some extra diesel 
fuel reserves. Mr. Wu immediately signed a borrowing contract with this new friend and agreed to 
repay the same amount of diesel fuel in a few months at no interest. Finally, when the founding 
members successfully expanded their own businesses, they were more capable of providing more 
frequent and stronger financial support to Mr. Wu. It was a constant challenge for luxury 
rosewood furniture companies to maintain enough cash flow, but the interest rate of short-term 
  25 
loans from commercial banks tended to be very high. It was therefore very common for Mr. Wu to 
borrow money from strong-tie network members for an interval of several months to buy raw 
materials, pay wages, and cover other related expenses before receiving payments from his 
customers. Such short-term borrowing was treated as a favor exchange since strong-tie network 
members have the obligation to help one another. Usually these short-term loans carried no or a 
very low interest rate due to the high level of pseudokin sentiment.  
 
Tie multiplexity 
Multiplexed ties, or “multi-stranded ties,” were first studied by anthropologists (e.g., 
Mitchell, 1969; Verbrugge, 1979) and defined as “the overlap of roles, exchanges, or 
affiliations in a social relationship.” (Verbrugge, 1979, p. 1286) Among social network 
analysts, Coleman’s (1988) term of “appropriability” (social ties of one kind can be used 
to achieve other purposes), Hwang’s concept of “mixed tie” (1987) and a more recent 
study on multiplexity (Shipilov & Li, 2014) demonstrate how this phenomenon can be 
integrated into social capital theories. 
Guanxi ties tend to be multiplexed. A guanxi tie usually fulfills diversified functions that 
“mix qualitatively different norms of exchange, namely expressive with instrumental, 
social with economic, symbolic with material, personal with public, friendship with 
businesslike, [and] familial with collegial”9 (Bian & Zhang, 2014, p. 427). First, tie 
multiplexity increases functional diversity for a given network size and represents a more 
efficient way to excavate network resources. Since guanxi ties are very costly and time-
consuming to establish and maintain, multiplexity therefore becomes critically important 
in mobilizing diversified resources with a limited number of core guanxi network 
members. Next, when a tie is multiplexed by both instrumental and emotional functions, 
trust and trustworthiness start to accumulate on that tie. The multiplexity nature of guanxi 
                                                
9 This multiplexity nature of guanxi provides a theoretical explanation of the social phenomenon that 
Chinese people often cannot clarify the different norms of exchanges across social domains when they are 
connected by guanxi, as widely observed by China researchers (Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2002; Kipnis, 
1997; Smart, 1993; Yan, 1996; Yang, 1994).	
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ties explains why Chinese entrepreneurs often conduct business with kin and pseudokin 
members in their networks, and actively attach emotional functions to important business 
relationships (Wong, 1988). Finally, compared to people linked by simplex ties, “people 
in a multi-stranded relationship interact with one another in many different contexts and 
are therefore less likely to be able to withdraw completely from contact with one another” 
(Mitchell, 1969, p. 23). That is, multiplexity provides an additional safeguard against tie 
decay.  
Multiplexity has the following two implications for how guanxi-based corporate social 
capital matters to the performance of Chinese SMEs. First, multiplexed guanxi ties carry 
instrumental interests and emotional values at the same time, which increases the social 
cost of opportunist behaviors (people usually cannot handle the price of cheating a 
business partner who is also a close relative or pseudokin) so that multiplexity effectively 
controls transaction cost. Second, the enduring nature of multiplexed ties increases the 
stability of long-term business relationships. Combining these two implications 
Relational Proposition 2 (RP-2) predicts that in China highly multiplexed ties 
generate structural advantages to control opportunistic behaviors and secure long-
term and stable business relations, all of which facilitate performance.  
Story of Mr. Xue 
Mr. Xue, forty years old in 2002, was a junior high school graduate. He established his furniture 
company in the early 1980s in town D. By the end of 2002 his company provided at least 200 jobs 
locally and reached an after-tax profit of 4.7 million RMB Yuan. As a very profitable business 
specializing in designing and selling high-end rosewood furniture in the domestic luxury furniture 
market, his company earned a good reputation as a top-ten brand in the local furniture industry of 
town D.   
Guanxi provided the initial investments for Mr. Xue’s business. Besides personal savings, Mr. 
Xue managed to obtain additional starting investments mainly from relatives and close friends. 
Only a small proportion of investment came from local bank loans. It was not easy to obtain 
financial support from state-owned banks in the early 1980s. The interest rate was very high, and 
the amount of loan was limited⎯around 2000 RMB Yuan. Local banks also required reliable 
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guarantors as a nonnegotiable precondition to endorse the private borrower’s creditworthiness. To 
meet this precondition, Mr. Xue depended heavily on close friends and relatives in his village who 
had known him for a long time, trusted him, and were willing to take unpredictable risks.  
After Mr. Xue’s business entered a stage of rapid expansion, informal financial support from 
family members, relatives, and close friends could no longer sustain the needs of constant cash 
flow and larger amount of hardware investment. Formal and institutionalized sources of financial 
supports from banks and credit unions then became crucial for the development of Mr. Xue’s 
company. However, informal social connections still played an important role in obtaining loans 
more quickly and cheaply. Mr. Xue mentioned Brother10 San (San ge) repeatedly during our face-
to-face interview as a crucial figure who bridged Mr. Xue to highly competitive commercial loan 
offers. Brother San had a strong tie with the local branch manager of state-owned Bank A. By 
mobilizing this tie, Mr. Xue obtained low-interest loans from Bank A with a much-simplified and 
quicker loan-approval process. This special guanxi with Brother San, Mr. Xue admitted, was the 
first key advantage for his business success.  
In addition to providing loan offers, Brother San also channeled the latest governmental policies 
and government purchasing opportunities to Mr. Xue. Brother San had close friends who worked 
for the local government, and some of his friends were officials who were decision makers for 
local commercial policies and governmental purchases. Mr. Xue and Brother San met frequently, 
and during their casual conversations insider-only information flowed naturally from Brother San 
to Xue. More importantly, the help of Brother San and his friends in the local government were 
not limited to information sharing. Substantial favor exchanges could lead to highly profitable 
business. For example, as a governmental support of the development of the local private 
economy, local policy loans were usually much cheaper and their payment terms were much 
longer than commercial loans. However, not all private companies in the local market had equal 
opportunity to be financed by this policy. Help from the inside bridged by Brother San became a 
competitive advantage for Mr. Xue.  
  
                                                
10 In Chinese culture “brotherhood” represents a typical pseudokin guanxi.  San and Mr. X were not 
relatives, but strong interpersonal sentiment and emotional functions were later attached to their 
instrumental relations. 	
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Obligations  
Feeling obliged to do something that is culturally proper to do contrasts guanxi-based 
corporate social capital with weak-tie-based corporate social capital in the moral 
dimension. Strong obligations among guanxi network members are culturally constructed 
and are deeply rooted in Confucian traditions. The core idea of moral obligations is that 
when interacting with guanxi network insiders, doing things that are morally “proper” 
always takes priority over doing things that are rationally “correct.” An extreme example 
is provided in the moral teaching of Confucius: “The Duke of She informed Confucius, 
saying, ‘Among us here there are those who may be styled upright in their conduct. If 
their father has stolen a sheep, they will bear witness to the fact.’ Confucius said, ‘Among 
us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different from this. The father 
conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. 
Uprightness is to be found in this.’”11  
In this story, rather than following the legal duty of a citizen (and also a rational 
calculation to avoid severe punishment for concealing the truth) to report crimes honestly 
to officials, it is the moral obligation of the son to conceal the crime of his father. 
Rational calculation is clearly not part of the son’s decision-making process. Of course, 
this is an extreme case of practicing moral obligation. In daily business activities, 
practicing moral obligations is usually observed as prioritizing the interests of guanxi 
partners over selfish rational calculations.  In another words, moral obligations include a 
set of culturally defined and mutually expected norms to provide reciprocal and unselfish 
favors to other guanxi network insiders. Following such moral standards also broadcasts 
the good reputation of helpers across the guanxi network and credits helpers with a moral 
advantage to receive larger favors in the future.  Therefore, Relational Proposition 3 
(RP-3): In China, culturally defined and socially coercive moral obligations provide 
                                                
11 Translated by James Legge (http://ctext.org/analects/zi-lu).  
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entrepreneurs with safety nets against unpredictable market fluctuations and 
ensure continuous favor exchanges in the future, all of which improve performance.  
Story of Mr. Yang 
Focusing mainly on lower-end furniture markets, Mr. Yang’s company in town D was a small and 
young business established in 2001. By the end of 2002 around sixty full-time employees worked 
for Mr. Yang’s business, assembling cheap wooden furniture. The majority of his business orders 
came from domestic markets.  
Compared to Mr. Wu and Mr. Xue, Mr. Yang had more experience in running a private business 
before he established his current factory in town D. Thirty-six years old in 2002 with a junior high 
school education, Mr. Yang was one of the earliest to leave his hometown in Zhejiang Province to 
take advantage of market reform in southeast China beginning in the early 1980s. Mobilizing 
guanxi with local administrative officials, Mr. Yang began in self-employment in Shenzhen as an 
agent for Chung Ying Street Closed Area Entry Permits. Years later, one of his weak-tie friends 
invited him to join in starting a furniture factory in Zhuhai, but this business soon ran into trouble 
due to serious wage disputes between his friend and the workers. When Mr. Yang was facing huge 
pressure and deciding to quit, one of his laoxiang in his inner guanxi circle, Mr. Kang, provided 
him with a huge favor. Mr. Kang first helped Mr. Yang establish a rosewood-painting workshop in 
town D, then started to outsource painting and finishing projects from his furniture company to 
Mr. Yang. To help Mr. Yang out in those years, Mr. Kang continued to pay him outsourcing 
prices higher than the market average. Gradually Mr. Yang not only fully recovered from his 
investment failure in Zhuhai but also accumulated enough money to open a new rosewood 
furniture showroom in town D in the early 1990s. In the late 1990s the profit margin of running a 
showroom declined dramatically, and Mr. Yang decided to begin his own furniture manufacturing 
business in 2001.  
Switching his business focus from the furniture retailing industry to furniture manufacturing was a 
difficult transition, but Mr. Yang was very lucky. He maintained a dense laoxiang network in 
town D (members in this network were all from Zhejiang Province and worked in town D), and 
this network advantage bridged him to the needed human capital and technical know-how. Several 
laoxiang in his guanxi network were highly experienced carpenters with high salaries and 
widespread reputations in town D. They were the first group of helpers willing to quit their current 
jobs and switch to Yang’s newly established company. Quitting jobs from fully established 
companies to join Mr. Yang’s new venture was not a very rational choice⎯they faced the 
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possibility of lower wages and higher risk, but “as laoxiang, we are obliged to help each other 
out.” After Mr. Yang’s new business started to grow, he began to hire more and more laoxiang in 
town D or from his hometown a thousand miles away. “Most of the skilled workers, all R&D, and 
all managerial staff are my laoxiang. We speak the same language. We have similar taste in 
designing. We trust each other and work together like a family. Besides, we always feel mutually 
supported since laoxiang are supposed to help each other out.”  
Table 2–1 summarizes the theoretical innovation of isotopic social capitals. Guanxi-based 
corporate social capital elaborated in this chapter is theorized as an isotope of weak-tie 
corporate social capital.  Guanxi-based social capital has a high level of particularism 
among guanxi network members.  Each guanxi tie is highly personalized, mutually 
particular, and multiplexed.  Players connected by guanxi have to follow culturally 
defined moral obligations of providing favors to help each other in a reciprocal manner.  
Grey cells in Table 2–1 show that guanxi-based corporate social capital is an isotope of 
weak-tie-based corporate social capital – they fulfill the same productive functions but 
their internal analytical dimensions take opposite values (high in three dimensions vs. 
low in these dimensions).  Besides these two extremes, we cannot rule out two additional 
possible social capital isotopes derived from associational/elite networks and ethnic 
networks.  I suggest that future social capital studies pay more attention to these isotopes 
to further enrich relational explanations of business performance.  
In the following chapters the propositions are operationalized into testable hypotheses, 
and quantitative survey data is used to examine the relative merits of these hypotheses.  

















(Source: Bian and Zhang 2014:428) 
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Chapter 3 Data, Measurement, and Analytic Strategy 
3.1 Data 
Competing theories of business performance will be tested using a survey data of eight 
hundred and thirty SMEs.  This questionnaire survey was carried out in 2003 to 
investigate how social capital stimulates entrepreneurship and facilitates development of 
nascent businesses in three industrial cities of the Pearl River Delta (PRD): Foshan (435 
cases), Zhongshan (206 cases), and Jiangmen (189 cases) (Figure 3–1 illustrates 
geographical distribution of samples).  This survey was a joint research project between 
the Division of Social Science in Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and 
the Research Institute for Guangdong Development in Sun Yat-Sen University (Bian, 
2008).  Among valid cases, fourteen collectively owned SMEs established long before 




Figure 3–1 Map of the Pearl River Delta (PRD) and sample size distribution in cities of Foshan, 
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PRD region is the economic center of Southeastern China.  This region covers nine 
densely populated prefecture-level cities surrounding the Pearl River Estuary, namely 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Foshan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, Zhuhai, Zhaoqing, and 
Huizhou.  PRD has been a powerful engine of China’s economic growth for more than 
three decades since 1978.  Fueled by continuing foreign investments, PRD drastically 
transformed itself from a poor rural region into the world’s factory.  Taking the 
momentum of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, booming local 
entrepreneurship, and export-oriented economic policies, PRD achieved a developmental 
miracle.  Behind this economic miracle, a large number of young private businesses 
makes PRD an ideal location to study performance of Chinese SMEs.  
In nine cities of PRD, Foshan, Zhongshan, and Jiangmen were selected to conduct this 
questionnaire survey because of following three reasons.  First, young private SMEs are 
highly concentrated in these three cities.  Four cities to the northeast of PRD (Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Huizhou) and Zhuhai city to the south of PRD are 
geographically adjacent to Hong Kong and Macau.  As a result, these five cities have 
long been dominated by Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) since 1978.  On the contrary, 
cities of Foshan, Zhongshan, and Jiangmen locate relatively far from Hong Kong and 
Macau and were less impacted by foreign capitals.  As a result, they started their 
economic development much later and utilized less FDI.  It is in those three cities can we 
easily locate nascent and locally-funded private businesses.  
Next, local private SMEs are industrially clustered in these three cities.  Analytical 
sample of 816 SMEs belong to six labor-intensive industries: textile/dyeing/finishing, 
metal processing, fashion and garment, ceramics, furniture, and building materials.  This 
clustering feature makes it easy to control industrial difference (Bian, 2008, p. 176).  
These six industries in China have long been labor-intensive industries, which make it 
very reasonable to use total employees, fixed assets, and value-added tax (VAT) to 
measure business performance. 
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Last but not least, the collaborating institution of this survey, Sun Yat-Sen University, has 
long been conducting academic research in Foshan, Zhongshan, and Jiangmen “and the 
prior knowledge about the industrial structure and social situations about these cities was 
immediately available to design and implement the survey there” (Bian, 2008, p. 176).  
Carefully selected interviewers who were familiar with local businesses carried out this 
survey during fall and winter of 2003 and yielded a response rate of 70%.  
This survey data is a representative sample.  “The distribution of size of survey factories 
is comparable to that of the population” (Bian, 2008, p. 177).  This survey data is also 
high in validity.  Around 84.3% of valid questionnaires (701 out of 830) were answered 
in-person by business founders and general managers of selected SMEs and 15.7% of 
questionnaires (129 out of 830) had to be finished by people in top managerial positions 
who had deep knowledge of their enterprises. 
Comparing to other surveys on the same topic, this study as a unique feature – measuring 
social networks of entrepreneurs by using name-generator, a standard device used by 
social network analysts to measure the networks of interpersonal connections around the 
world (Marsden, 1987).  Rather than capturing time and money spent on building and 
maintaining guanxi, this survey collects social network data directly.  All three guanxi-
based corporate social capital dimensions can be derived from the name-generator.  This 
unique feature is another important reason why I chose this data to examine propositions 
proposed in Chapter 2. 
3.2 Measurement 
3.2.1  Performance 
Business performance is a multi-facet concept.  In this study, three indicators capturing 
scale and revenue are suitable measures of SMEs’ performance in labor-intensive 
industries: total number of employees, fixed assets, and value-added tax (VAT).  These 
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indicators are highly correlated.  As a result, a factor analysis is conducted to generate a 
performance index as a single continuous measure of business performance. 
Total number of employees is a direct measure of business scale.  In this study, this 
measure captures numbers of manual labors working for a given SME at the end of 2002.  
In my factor analysis, the natural logarithm of this measure will be used.  Table 3–1 shows 
that in the analytic sample, the average of total employees is 63 (its natural logarithm is 
4.145).  Fixed asset is another measure of business scale.  To minimize the impact of 
missing data and increase measurement reliability, this study takes average of fixed assets 
(in unit of 10,000 Yuan) across three consecutive years of 2000, 2001, and 2002.  If 
respondents provide valid answers to fixed asset of all three years, the average is the sum 
of three observations over 3.  If there is any one missing observation across three years, 
then the average value is the mean of two available records.  If there is only one available 
observation, then that valid value is used directly.  The average is later transformed into 
its natural logarithm for factor analysis.  The analytic sample shows an averaged fixed 
asset of 1.2 million RMB (natural logarithm is 4.767).  VAT (in unit of 1,000 Yuan) is a 
measure of business revenue.  For SMEs in this study, SMEs with higher taxable sales 
income pay higher VAT.  An averaged VAT is generated from three yearly observations 
from 2000 to 2002.  The analytic sample shows an averaged VAT of 13,900 RMB 
(natural logarithm is 2.631).   
Table 3–1 Descriptive statistics for observed and  
factor measurements of corporate performance 
 Mean S.D. Min Max Factor loading Performance Index 0.000 0.919 -2.209 2.920 
Ln(total employees in 2002) 4.145 1.284 0.693 8.006 0.754 
Ln(avg. fixed assets, 2000-2002) 4.767 1.780 -0.149 9.916 0.852 
Ln(avg. VAT, 2000-2002) 2.631 1.770 -3.117 7.869 0.858 
N = 623; Alpha reliability coef. = 0.8626 
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Table 3–2 Correlation coefficients and list-wise sample sizes of performance measurements 
 (1) (2) (3) 
(1) Ln(Total employees) 1.0000    
 (810)   
(2) Ln(Averaged fixed assets) 0.6684 1.0000   
 (683) (685)  
(3) Ln(Averaged VAT) 0.7001 0.7857 1.0000  
 (701) (625) (705) 
* All correlation coefficients are significant at p<0.001 level; sample size in parentheses. 
Three indicators of business performance are highly correlated (and their correlation 
coefficients are statistically significant at the p<0.001 level as summarized in Table 3–2), 
which makes it statistically possible to conduct a factor analysis and generate a single 
continuous measure of performance.  A principal factor analysis (see factor loadings in 
the last column of Table 3–1) with 623 cases that have no missing value on any of three 
indicators generates a single performance factor.  This factor has a mean of zero and 
higher value in this performance index represents better performance.  The alpha 
reliability of this performance factor reaches 0.8626.  
3.2.2  Measures of nonrelational explanations 
Transaction cost  
The transaction cost proposition predicts that SMEs have a higher performance level if 
they effectively control the costs of information searching, contracting, and monitoring 
by using services and regulations of local trade associations and local governments as 
well as by building up trust with business partners.  To have an overall level of 
transaction cost, a principle factor is extracted from following five indicators. 
First four indicators are subjective evaluations of the effectiveness (1=not useful at all, 
…, 3=so-so, …, 5=very useful) of following activities in reducing transaction cost: (1) 
government’s legal regulations of market transactions and marketing services 
(exhibitions or fairs) (this indicator has a mean of 3.993 and a standard deviation of 
0.715); (2) marketing services provided by local trade associations (mean of 3.454 and 
standard deviation of 0.822); (3) information of business opportunities and new 
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technologies advertised by local trade associations (mean of 3.516 and standard deviation 
of 0.796); and (4) consensus on proper business ethics advocated by local trade 
associations (mean of 3.199 and standard deviation of 0.816).  The fifth indicator of 
transaction cost is a subjective evaluation of trust.  Each respondent provides subjective 
evaluations of trust (1=no trust at all, …, 4=so-so, …, 7=strong trust) on his/her three 
most important business partners.  Average of these three answers12 (the average is 5.440 
with a standard deviation of 0.821) is then used in factor analysis.  A principle factor 
analysis extracts a single continuous measure of transaction cost from these five 
indicators.  The factor score of transaction cost has a mean of zero and ranges from 
negative three to positive two.  Higher factor scores represent lower transaction cost and 
lower factor scores denote higher transaction cost.  To save sample size, missing values 
in indicators are imputed by their own mean values (shown in Table 3–3) before factor 
analysis.  A dummy variable showing status of imputations (1=at least one indicator is 
imputed; 0=no imputation) will be included as a control variable in regression models to 
further isolate possible impacts due to this imputation. 
With overall transaction cost measured by this factor score, NP-1 is operationalized into 
the nonrelational hypothesis 1 (NH-1): higher values in the transaction cost factor 
imply lower transaction costs, which leads to higher values in performance index.  
 
Institutional legitimacy 
Institutional legitimacy predicts that SMEs actively internalizing mainstream ideology 
and political institutions, such as establishing branch of Communist Party of China 
(CPC), union, and workers’ congress, tend to perform better.  Three institutions in this 
proposition are measured directly by three yes/no questions: in your enterprise, do you 
have (Have=1; Don’t have=0): (1) CPC branch; (2) union; and (3) workers’ congress?  
                                                
12	If a respondent provides subjective evaluations of trust to two business partners, then the average is 
defined as the sum of two evaluations over two.		
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Valid cases show that on average7.3% of SMEs have active CPC branches, 24.7% have 
unions, and 32.3% adopt the institution of worker’s congress.  An overall measure of 
levels of institutional legitimacy is a sum of these three dummy indicators.  The sum, 
ranging from zero to three, is treated as a continuous variable of institutional legitimacy13 
in following models.  On average, this institutional legitimacy measure has a mean of 
0.638 and a standard deviation of 0.867 (see descriptive statistics in Table 3–3).  Higher 
values in this measure represent higher levels of legitimacy.  With institutional 
explanation operationalized in this way, nonrelational hypothesis 2 (NH-2) predicts 
that SMEs with higher values in the institutional legitimacy measure will have 
higher values in performance index.  
Table 3–3 Descriptive statistics of observed and factor measures for  
nonrelational theories of business performance 
Nonrelational Measures N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Transaction Cost (Principle factor score) 816 0.000 0.665 -3.140 2.000 
Gov’s market regulations/service this useful 731 3.993 0.715 1 5 
Market service of trade associations is useful 599 3.454 0.822 1 5 
Information service of trade associations is useful 605 3.516 0.796 1 5 
Governing and regulations of trade associations is useful 573 3.199 0.816 1 5 
Trust with 3 VIPs  797 5.440 0.821 1.688 7.000 
Institutional Legitimacy (Sum of dummy indicators) 816 0.638 0.867 0 3 
Branch of CPC (Have=1; Don’t have=0) 810 0.073 ---- 0 1 
Union (Have=1; Don’t have=0) 814 0.247 ---- 0 1 
Worker’s congress (Have=1; Don’t have=0) 807 0.323 ---- 0 1 
 
3.2.3  Measures of relational explanations 
Particularism 
In Chinese culture, five kinds of social relations with strong interpersonal sentiments are 
prevailingly perceived as “being particular” – kin/relative, classmate/schoolmate, 
comrade-in-army (people serving in the same military unit together), laoxiang (people 
sharing the same birthplace, dialects, and local culture), and brother-like friends (similar 
                                                
13	To save sample size, missing values on each of those three indicators are imputed with “0 (no)” before 
summing them up.		
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to the concept of brotherhood in the West).  A business relation is considered to be 
particular if both parties of this relation are connected by at least one of these five types 
of ties. A business relation is higher in the level of particularism if it can be classified into 
more than one of these five sentiment-rich relations. 
A name generator identifies these particular relations in entrepreneurs’ social ties with 
their most important three business partners.  Following five yes/no questions (Yes=1; 
No=0) were asked repeatedly with regard to three nominated business partners (k=1, 2, 
3): 
The kth business partner is my kin/relative (denoted as Pk1 in Equation 3–1);  
The kth business partner is my former class/schoolmates (Pk2);  
The kth business partner is my former comrade-in-army (Pk3); 
The kth business partner is my laoxiang (Pk4); 
The kth business partner is my brother-like friends (Pk5). 
Equation 3–1 generates a continuous variable as the measure of overall particularism14.  
Since some business partners are more important than others, proportions of the total 
2002 annual sales due to businesses with the kth most important partner, wk, is included 
in this calculation as a weighting factor.  Higher values in the measure denote stronger 
particularism. 
!"#$%&'("#%) = +, !,-.-/01,/0  																												= +0 !00 + !04 + ⋯+ !0. + ⋯+ +1 !10 + !14 + ⋯+ !1.  
Equation 3–1 
                                                
14	Missing values of particularism are imputed with its mean value. For each case, a dummy variable 
denoting status of imputation is generated. It will be coded as “1” if the particularism measure is imputed, 
otherwise it will be coded as “0”. This dummy indicator will be included in regression models to further 
isolate possible impacts due to imputation.	
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Table 3–4 shows that the measure of particularism ranges from zero to five with a mean of 
0.988 and a standard deviation of 0.813.  The median of this measure is one.  To use this 
measure in counterfactual models in Chapter 5, this continuous measure of particularism 
is grouped into a dummy variable “High in particularism” (1=particularism is higher than 
or equal to its median; 0=particularism is lower than its median).  In 816 analytic 
samples, 66.5% respondents have particularism higher than or equal to its median. 
Using such a measure of particularism, RP-1 is operationalized into relational 
hypothesis 1 (RH-1): SMEs with higher values in particularism measure have 
higher values in performance index.  
 
Multiplexity 
Social tis for both business and non-business activities are multiplexed ties.  Among all 
kinds of non-business activities, in Chinese culture, greeting (in many different ways 
such as face-to-face conversations, phone calls, short messages, postcards/mails, 
electronic postcards/emails) and gift-giving before and during public holidays and Lunar 
New Year, improve sentiments between focal entrepreneurs and their business partners, 
strengthen the identity of “being an insider”, and overlap non-business functions over 
business relations.  Two typical non-business activities capture the essence of 
multiplexed social ties with three most important business partners (k=1, 2, 3): 
Greeting to kth business partner during public holidays (denoted as Mk1 in 
Equation 3–2); 
Exchanging gifts with the kth business partner during Lunar New Year (Mk2). 
Each of these questions is a yes/no question with “Yes” coded as “1” and “No” coded as 
“0”.  Using Equation 3–2, I generate a continuous measure of overall multiplexity15.  
                                                
15	Missing values of multiplexity are imputed with its mean value. For each case, a dummy variable 
denoting status of imputation is generated. It will be coded as “1” if the multiplexity measure is imputed, 
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Since some business partners are more important than others, the contribution of kth most 
important partner to the 2002 annual sales of focal enterprises, wk, is included in this 
calculation as a weighting factor.  Higher values in this measure represent higher levels 
of multiplexity. 
6'($%7(89%$: = +, 6,-4-/01,/0= +0 600 + 604 + ⋯+ +1 610 + 614  Equation 3–2 
 
Table 3–4 shows that the measure of multiplexity ranges from zero to two with an average 
of 1.186 and a standard deviation of 0.717.  The median of this measure is one.  It is clear 
that multiplexity is a very common practice for Chinese entrepreneurs. To include this 
measure in counterfactual analyses, multiplexity is cut into a dummy variable where 1 
denotes multiplexity higher than or equal to its median value and 0 denotes multiplexity 
is lower than its median.  This dummy variable shows that 71.3% of entrepreneurs have 
multiplexity higher than or equal to median.  
Using multiplexity measured in such a way, this study operationalizes the second 
relational proposition into relational hypothesis 2 (RH-2): SMEs with higher values in 
multiplexity measure have higher values in performance index.  
 
Obligation 
Levels of feeling obliged to provide favors to network insiders is a critical component of 
the moral dimension of corporate social capital. Chinese guanxi ties carry stronger and 
more culturally coercive expectations to follow the codes of reciprocal and sometimes 
                                                
otherwise it will be coded as “0”. This dummy indicator will be included in regression models to further 
isolate possible impacts due to imputation. 	
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self-sacrificing obligations.  Two seven-point scales (7=Strongly disagree; … ; 3=So-so; 
… ; 1=Strongly agree) in the name generator directly measure to what extend three most 
important business partners feel obliged to provide favors during business transactions 
(k=1, 2, 3): 
To achieve his/her own goals, the kth business partner is rarely benevolent 
(denoted as Ok1 in Equation 3–3); 
To achieve his/her own goals, the kth business partner takes advantages of me 
(Ok2). 
Equation 3–3 generates a continuous measure of obligation by taking the relative 
importance of each business partners into consideration16.  Higher values in this measure 
mean stronger culture of practicing obligations in doing business.  Table 3–4 shows that 
the average obligation is 4.583 with a standard deviation of 1.625.  Its median is 4.5.  To 
use this measure in counterfactual models, this measure is cut into a dummy variable 
where 1 represents higher than or equal to median of this measure and 0 means lower 
than median level of obligation.  In 816 analytic samples, 55.8% of entrepreneurs are 
doing business in networks with strong cultural preference of practicing obligations.   
;<(%="$%>? = +, ;,-4-/021,/0= +0 ;00 + ;042 + ⋯+ +1 ;10 + ;142  
 
Equation 3–3 
Measured in this way, obligation is expected to be positively associated with 
performance.  The RP-3 is operationalized into relational hypothesis 3 (RH-3): SMEs 
with higher values in obligation measure have higher values in performance index.  
                                                
16	Missing values of obligation are imputed with its mean value. For each case, a dummy variable denoting 
status of imputation is generated. It will be coded as “1” if the obligation measure is imputed, otherwise it 
will be coded as “0”. This dummy indicator will be included in regression models to further isolate possible 
impacts due to imputation.	
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Table 3–4 Descriptive statistics of measures for relational explanations of business performance 
Relational Measures N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Particularism 816 0.988 0.813 0 5 
1st business partner is my kin/relative (Yes=1) 740 0.115 ---- 0 1 
2nd business partner is my kin/relative (Yes=1) 624 0.087 ---- 0 1 
3rd business partner is my kin/relative (Yes=1) 552 0.078 ---- 0 1 
1st business partner was my former classmate (Yes=1) 723 0.087 ---- 0 1 
2nd business partner was my former classmate (Yes=1) 613 0.086 ---- 0 1 
3rd business partner was my former classmate (Yes=1) 546 0.086 ---- 0 1 
1st business partner was my comrade-in-army (Yes=1) 709 0.034 ---- 0 1 
2nd business partner was my comrade-in-army (Yes=1) 603 0.045 ---- 0 1 
3rd business partner was my comrade-in-army (Yes=1) 537 0.060 ---- 0 1 
1st business partner is my laoxiang (Yes=1) 719 0.089 ---- 0 1 
2nd business partner is my laoxiang (Yes=1) 622 0.096 ---- 0 1 
3rd business partner is my laoxiang (Yes=1) 556 0.112 ---- 0 1 
1st business partner is my brother-like friend (Yes=1) 768 0.759 ---- 0 1 
2nd business partner is my brother-like friend (Yes=1) 644 0.745 ---- 0 1 
3rd business partner is my brother-like friend (Yes=1) 580 0.710 ---- 0 1 
Particularism squared 816 1.648 3.178 0 25 
High in Particularism (Yes=1) 816 0.665 ---- 0 1 
Imputation dummy for Particularism (Imputed=1) 816 0.020 ---- 0 1 
Multiplexity 816 1.186 0.717 0 2 
Holiday greeting with 1st business partner (Yes=1) 769 0.771 ---- 0 1 
Holiday greeting with 2nd business partner (Yes=1) 657 0.755 ---- 0 1 
Holiday greeting with 3rd business partner (Yes=1) 588 0.752 ---- 0 1 
Lunar new year gift exchanging with 1st business partner 
(Yes=1) 
734 0.507 ---- 0 1 
Lunar new year gift exchanging with 2nd business 
partner (Yes=1) 
631 0.490 ---- 0 1 
Lunar new year gift exchanging with 3rd business partner 
(Yes=1) 
561 0.462 ---- 0 1 
Multiplexity squared 816 1.944 1.601 0 4 
High in Multiplexity (Yes=1) 816 0.713 0.453 0 1 
Imputation dummy for Multiplexity (Imputed=1) 816 0.043 ---- 0 1 
Obligation 816 4.583 1.231 0.429 7 
1st business partner is rarely benevolent 792 4.747 1.420 1 7 
2nd business partner is rarely benevolent 686 4.694 1.366 1 7 
3rd business partner is rarely benevolent 621 4.626 1.434 1 7 
1st business partner takes advantages of me 797 4.566 1.625 1 7 
2nd business partner takes advantages of me 692 4.574 1.565 1 7 
3rd business partner takes advantages of me 626 4.575 1.588 1 7 
Obligation squared 816 22.554 10.969 0.184 49 
High in Obligation (Yes=1) 816 0.558 ---- 0 1 
Imputation dummy for Obligation (Imputed=1) 816 0.023 ---- 0 1 
 
3.2.4  Control variables 
To control effects of other possible factors on performance, two sets of control variables 
are introduced to regression models.  The first set of control variables captures 
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demographic attributes of enterprises.  The second set of control variables focuses on 
attributes of entrepreneurs (See Table 3–5 for descriptive statistics). 
SMEs in the analytic sample belong to six labor-intensive industries of 
textile/dyeing/finishing (24.8%), metal processing (21.4%), fashion and garment (16.2%), 
ceramic (14.2%), furniture (12.5%), and building materials (10.9%).  A set of dummy 
variables with furniture industry as the reference category is used as control variables of 
industries in regression models.  
SMEs established in different historical periods may differ in current performance.  In 
816 cases, 22.6% of SMEs established right after the opening and reform policy took 
effect (1979-1991) and they were early birds in China’s emerging markets.  Following 
them, 52.2% of SMEs started their businesses after Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 Southern Tour 
(1992-1999), which politically reassure the long-term nature and continuity of the 
opening and reform policy.  Another 25.3% of SMEs were new ventures (2000-2003) 
who took the advantage of China’s reaccessions to WTO on November 15, 1999.  To 
control possible period effects, a set of dummies with “established in 1979-1991” as the 
reference group is used in all regression models.  
Ownership effects on performance are controlled by using a set of dummies with 
“collective owned” as the reference category.  In 816 cases, 83.1% were private/family 
owned enterprises and 13.6% were foreign direct invested (FDI) enterprises.  Only 3.3% 
were collectively owned.  
As a measure of enterprise-level human capital, the percentage of employees with at least 
high school (HS) or vocational high school (VHS) degrees in 2002 (the averaged 
percentage is around 16%) will be controlled in all regression models.  Other important 
controls of enterprise attributes include: (1) A dummy variable indicating whether a SME 
has affiliated business ventures invested by the same entrepreneur (11.1% of SEMs in 
analytic sample were not the only venture invested by their owners); (2) enterprises 
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nominated by local governments as a longtou (“dragon head”) enterprise (10% of 
sampled SMEs were longtou enterprises in 2002) to enjoy special policy supports. 
Finally, following attributes of entrepreneurs will also be controlled: (1) age in 2002 
(ranges from 22 to 76 with an average of 41.1); (2) gender (93.9% of general managers in 
analytical samples were male); (3) years of formal schooling by 2002 (the mean years of 
schooling was about 11.25, which is slightly less than senior high school ranges from 
primary school to BA and above); (4) CCP member status (15.9% of general managers in 
2002 were Communist Party members); and (5) months of training before taking the 
general manager’s position (on average, general managers only had less than 5 months of 
training).  
Table 3–5 Descriptive statistics of control variables 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Enterprise attributes      
Industries      
Textile, dyeing, and finishing 816 0.248 ---- 0 1 
Metal processing 816 0.214 ---- 0 1 
Fashion and garment 816 0.162 ---- 0 1 
Ceramics 816 0.142 ---- 0 1 
Furniture (Ref.) 816 0.125 ---- 0 1 
Building materials 816 0.109 ---- 0 1 
Established years      
1979 – 1991 (Ref.) 811 0.226 ---- 0 1 
1992 – 1999  811 0.522 ---- 0 1 
2000 – 2003  811 0.253 ---- 0 1 
Ownership      
Private/family owned 816 0.831 ---- 0 1 
FDI/Co.Ltd. 816 0.136 ---- 0 1 
Collectively owned (Ref.) 816 0.033 ---- 0 1 
Has any affiliated enterprise (Yes=1) 803 0.111 ---- 0 1 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) 798 0.100 ---- 0 1 
% of employees with education above high school/ 
vocational high school 
768 15.925 23.252 0 100 
Entrepreneur attributes      
Age 813 41.095 8.920 22 76 
Male (Yes=1) 814 0.939 ---- 0 1 
Party membership (Yes=1) 811 0.159 ---- 0 1 
Years of schooling 810 11.251 2.848 6 16 
Job training experience (months) 816 4.549 12.496 0 96 
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3.3 Analytic strategy 
Relative merits of nonrelational and relational explanations of performance will be 
examined by regression models in Chapter 4 and 5.  In Chapter 4, my analytic strategy 
starts with a set of nested ordinary least square (OLS) regression models.  Using 
performance index as the dependent variable (Y), a baseline model containing only 
control variables (X) will be estimated first (Equation 3–3), where Y is an n x 1 vector for 
n valid cases, X is an n x k matrix containing k control variables,	A represents a constant 
term, B denotes a k x 1 coefficient vector for k control variables, and the error term C--D E 0, H4I  is assumed to follow a normal distribution with a zero mean and a constant 
variance of H4. 
J = A + KB + C Equation 3–4 
   
Next, to evaluate nonrelational hypotheses NH-1 and NH-2, measures of nonrelational 
explanations will enter the baseline model as independent variables one at a time.  In this 
step, statistically significant nonrelational variables (NV) will be retained in model (see 
Equation 3–5).  
J = A + KB + NVN + C Equation 3–5 
 
Then, the last step of this nested OLS modeling strategy evaluates relational hypotheses 
RH-1, RH-2, and RH-3, one at a time.  It treats NV and X as control variables and 
incorporates each measure of three dimensions of guanxi-based corporate social capital, 
namely particularism, multiplexity, and obligation, as an independent variable (RV), one 
at a time. Linear, squared, and dummy terms of RVs will be also tested in turn. OLS 
models in this step take on a form as Equation 3–6, where O is the coefficient for the 
independent variable RV and I expect O to be positive and statistically significant.  
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J = A + KB + NVγ + QRO + C Equation 3–6 
 
OLS models defined above carry two interrelated assumptions, which guarantees γ and O 
to be unbiased linear estimates of causal effects of NVs and RVs on performance: (1) 
independent variables NVs and RVs are exogenous reasons of performance and there is 
no correlation between independent variables and control variables; (2) values of 
independent variables are randomly assigned and there is no self-selection process to 
violate such randomness.  These two assumptions are interrelated.  If an independent 
variable is correlated with any control variable(s) in X, then that independent variable is 
not an exogenous reason of the dependent variable and its values are no longer randomly 
assigned.  This is a typical scenario of endogeneity.  Fortunately, this issue is less severe 
when we use OLS models to evaluate nonrelational hypotheses NR-1 and NR-2.  
Theoretically speaking, nonrelational explanations of organizational performance treat 
organizations as passive receivers of changing environmental factors, which are beyond 
the direct control of enterprises and cannot be altered by any individual enterprise.  
Therefore, measures of nonrelational explanations, namely factor score of truncation cost 
and institutional legitimacy, can be seen as exogenous reasons. 
However, variables measuring relational explanations of performance do not carry such a 
nice exogenous nature.  Instead, the endogeneity of guanxi-based corporate social capital 
measures in RH-1, RH-2, and RH-3 requires my analytical strategy to explicitly address 
this problem of causality.  Empirical evidence has already shown (Mouw, 2003) that 
attributes of social network/social capital and economic outcomes tend to share some 
common reasons, which prevent us from detecting true causal causal effects of social 
capital measures.  In this study, I cannot simply rule out the possibility that attributes of 
entrepreneurs and enterprises (some variables in X) causally determine RVs and 
performance index simultaneously.  If it were the case, basic assumptions of OLS models 
would be violated and I have to face consequences that (1) the causal relationship 
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between guanxi measures and performance are spurious; (2) effects of guanxi measures 
are biased and inconsistent estimates due to nonrandom self-selections.  
To solve this problem of causality, four methods in the counterfactual analysis 
framework will be conducted in Chapter 5 to adjust biased estimates of OLS models in 
Chapter 4.  These four methods are two model-based methods of treatment effect model 
using regression adjustment (RA) (Heckman, 1974; Maddala, 1983) and doubly-robust 
estimator using inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) 
(Wooldridge, 2010) as well as two data-based methods of propensity-score weighting 
(PSW) (Rosenbaum, 1987) and propensity score matching (PSM) (Imbens, 2004; 
Rosenbaum, 2002; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 1985; Schafer & Kang, 2008).  Unlike 
OLS models, counterfactual models in this study examine causal effects of guanxi-based 
corporate social capital by using dichotomous RVs.  Following the conversion of 
counterfactual analysis, the category coded as “1” in a dichotomous RV (i.e. “High in 
particularism (Yes=1, No=0)”) is called “treatment” and the “0”-coded category is named 
as “control.” Cases with “RV=1” are cases belonging to the treatment group; cases with 
“RV=0” are cases in the control group.  The predicted probability of “RV=1” for a case 
is defined as the propensity score for that case.  The model making such a prediction is 
called selection model.  Predictors in a selection model are called confounders (K) and 
usually they are a chosen subset of X, which means K ∈ K.  The model linking an RV to 
the final dependent variable (performance index, denoted as Y) is called an outcome 
model.  
Although all counterfactual methods aim at isolating confounder effects and approaching 
causal conclusions, it is still far from reaching a consensus on which modeling strategy is 
the best practice in the counterfactual framework (see most recent review by King and 
Nielsen (2016)).  Therefore, careful data-driven comparisons across these approaches are 
needed.   
To conduct data-driven comparisons, in Chapter 5, my analytic strategy starts from two 
model-based methods, RA and IPWRA, where selection models are conventional Probit 
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regressions and outcome models are OLS models.  Model-based methods treat selection 
and outcome models as simultaneous equations whose coefficients are jointly estimated 
in a maximum-likelihood procedure.  These methods depend on Probit regressions to 
explicitly model how cases are assigned to the treatment group given observed 
confounders (K).  This requirement implies that researchers have already known the 
correct specification of selection models, including correct inclusion of K, correct 
transformation (such as taking square, natural logarithm, square-root, and etc.) of 
variables in K, and correct interaction terms between variables in K.  As a pioneering 
research of guanxi-based corporate social capital, this study has to face a lack of 
preexisting theories and empirical guidelines to reach correct specifications of selection 
models.   
To overcome this problem of model misspecification, I conduct two data-based methods, 
namely PSW and PSM, where estimated propensity scores are obtained from Generalized 
Boost Model (GBM) (Friedman, 2001, 2002; Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2009; 
Ridgeway, 1999, 2012).  Based on the theory of regression tree, GBM automatically 
identifies selection models with optimal transformations and interactions of variables in K and estimates propensity scores with higher precision comparing to manually specified 
Probit regressions (Loh, 2011).  Using propensity scores estimated in this way, data-
based methods make changes (weighting and pruning) to observed data so that treatment-
status assignments of RVs in the new data can be approximately random.  In data-based 
methods, there is no need to explicitly model how cases are assigned to the treatment 
group and the outcome models are conventional OLS models.   
At the end of Chapter 5, I will compare findings derived from five modeling strategies, 
namely OLS, RA, IPWRA, PSW, and PSM, and then draw causal conclusions of how 
guanxi-based corporate social capital determining business performance of SMEs in 
China. 
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Chapter 4 Statistical Results from OLS Models 
 
4.1 Baseline Model 
This chapter provides a series of preliminary tests of the non-relational and relational 
hypotheses of business performance using traditional OLS models.  The tests start from a 
baseline model where the dependent variable is performance index and independent 
variables are enterprise and entrepreneur attributes.   
Model 1 in Table 4–1 regresses performance index on enterprise attributes.  Comparing to 
the reference group of furniture industry, SMEs in industries of textile (-0.367, p<0.001), 
metal processing (-0.260, p<0.01), and ceramics (0.809, p<0.001) show significant 
difference in performance.  Some SMEs have affiliated subcompanies.  A dummy 
variable indicating this status is significantly and positively predicting performance 
(0.364, p<0.01).  Some SMEs were designated as leading enterprises, or “Longtou” 
(dragon heads) in Chinese, by local governments and were entitled to special policy 
supports, such as faster approval of loans with larger amount and lower interest rates 
from local commercial banks, direct governmental investments, special government 
purchases, and etc.  Model 1 shows that being Longtou SMEs is positively related to 
performance (0.690, p<0.001).  This result reminds us that in China’s on-going economic 
reform, local governments are playing an influential role to seal the fate of private 
businesses.   
Another measure of corporate attributes is human capital of employees.  Percentage of 
employees with high school (HS) or vocational high school (VHS) degrees is positively 
and significantly related to performance (0.013, p<0.001).  Even if SMEs in the analytic 
sample were labor-intensive factories, education of employees is still a crucial factor to 
increase productivity and business performance.  This result is highly consistent with 
interviews of entrepreneurs in local furniture industry: highly educated professional R&D 
teams generated an important human capital advantage in a highly competitive industry 
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because of their taste and creativity to design fashionable and feature-rich new products.  
Except for these effects, Model 1 shows no significant performance difference across 
established years and ownerships.  
Model 2 in Table 4–1 further incorporates entrepreneur attributes and demonstrates a 
significant political capital effect on performance.  Entrepreneurs with Communist Party 
membership tended to run their businesses more successfully (0.365, p<0.001), all other 
things equal.  Roughly 16% of entrepreneurs in the analytic sample were Party members 
at the time of survey.  Their political loyalty rewarded them in the business world: 
entrepreneurs with Party membership have higher frequencies to interact with local Party 
and government officials, higher legitimacy to participate in local policy-making, and 
more chances to obtain insider-only information.  These exclusive opportunities 
eventually generate unique competitive advantages for these “red” entrepreneurs.  Except 
for these effects, Model 2 shows no significant age, gender, and educational17 effects on 
performance.  
Regardless of statistical significance, all variables in Model 2 will also be treated as 
controls in following OLS models because of their theoretical importance.  And including 
these variables makes my models comparable to similar studies that control these 
attributes.  
  
                                                
17	Insignificance of those three measures cannot be simply explained as the lack of human capital effect on 
performance. In fact, the effect of entrepreneur human capital on performance is highly possible to be 
mediated by the ownership dummy of “FDI/Co. Ltd” (0.439, p<0.05). Confined to 570 analytic sample in 
Model 2, a t-test of averaged educational years of entrepreneurs between FDI and non-FDI SMEs shows 
that FDI entrepreneurs has a mean educational years of 13.34 (above senior high school level) 2.62 years 
longer than non-FDI entrepreneurs. The difference of is statistically significant (p<0.001) and substantially.  
Similar t-test is also conducted to compare mean months of professional training between FDI and non-FDI 
entrepreneurs. The averaged lengths of training for FDI entrepreneurs is 14.15 months and this value is 
only 2.30 months for non-FDI entrepreneurs.  Such a difference of 11.85 months is both statistically 
(p<0.001) and substantially significant.  Combining findings above, FDI SMEs tend to have highly 
educated and better trained entrepreneurs, the human capital effect of entrepreneurs is highly possible to be 
mediated by the ownership status.	
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Table 4–1 Baseline Model 
Performance Index (1) (2) 
Enterprise attributes   
Industries (Ref. = Furniture)   
Textile, dyeing, and finishing -0.367*** -0.345*** 
 (0.093) (0.091) 
Metal processing -0.260** -0.283** 
 (0.096) (0.095) 
Fashion and garment -0.097 -0.105 
 (0.108) (0.107) 
Ceramics 0.809*** 0.698*** 
 (0.134) (0.134) 
Building materials 0.115 0.023 
 (0.117) (0.116) 
Established year (Ref. = 1979-1991)   
1992 – 1999 -0.025 -0.029 
 (0.075) (0.074) 
2000 – 2003 -0.104 -0.099 
 (0.091) (0.090) 
Ownership (Ref. = Collective owned)   
Private/family owned -0.243 0.005 
 (0.183) (0.190) 
FDI/Co.Ltd. 0.305 0.439* 
 (0.199) (0.204) 
Has any affiliated enterprise (Yes=1) 0.364** 0.340** 
 (0.112) (0.111) 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) 0.690*** 0.572*** 
 (0.113) (0.113) 
% of employees with education above HS/VHS 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Entrepreneur attributes   
Age (year)  0.000 
  (0.003) 
Male (Yes=1)  0.190 
  (0.113) 
Years of schooling  0.023 
  (0.012) 
Party membership (Yes=1)  0.365*** 
  (0.094) 
Job training experience (months)  0.006 
  (0.003) 
Constant 0.038 -0.665* 
 (0.203) (0.318) 
Adjusted R-square 0.454 0.476 
N 574 570 
^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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4.2 Non-relational Hypotheses of Performance 
 
Hypotheses of transaction cost (NH-1) and institutional legitimacy (NH-2) are tested in 
this section.  Model 1 in   
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Table 4–2 does not support transaction cost hypothesis of performance.  NH-1 expects to 
see that factor score of transaction cost has positively and significantly effect on 
performance index.  However, transaction cost factor in Model 1 shows no significant 
effect on performance.  It seems that a hypothesis derived from observations of large 
enterprises in mature market economies that have the capability to incorporate risky 
market transactions into their internal bureaucratic structures is less powerful to explain 
performance of SMEs in an emerging market economy. 
Next, Model 2 in   
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Table 4–2 strongly supports the hypothesis of institutional legitimacy.  NH-2 predicts that 
enterprises with higher institutional legitimacy have higher performance.  Model 2 shows 
that, all other things equal, one unit higher in the measure of institutional legitimacy will 
lead to 0.112 unit increase in the performance index (p<0.01).  Since the measure of 
institutional legitimacy is a sum of three dummies, namely having CPC branch (yes=1), 
having labor’s union (yes=1), and having worker’s congress (yes=1), an SME with all 
those three institutional constructs will on average yield 0.336 higher in the performance 
index comparing to SMEs that had comparable attributes but refused to adopt these 
institutions.  During China’s on-going economic reform, institutional legitimacy of 
private businesses comes from active internalization of the Party’s ideology and 
compliance with institutional arrangements that are politically correct.  SMEs with higher 
institutional legitimacy tend to follow ideological guidance and legal regulations of the 
Party and local governments more closely.  Such active internalization and compliance 
make SMEs face less institutional discrimination and equip them with stronger 
bargaining power when interacting with local authorities.  Political loyalty and 
institutional alignment will be rewarded in terms of policy supports and political/legal 
protections.  And this advantage is productive and generates better performance. 
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Table 4–2 Models of Non-relational Hypotheses of Performance 
Performance Index (1) (2) 
Transaction Cost Theory 0.013  
 (0.043)  
Institutional Legitimacy  0.112** 
  (0.037) 
Enterprise attributes   
Industries (Ref. = Furniture)   
Textile, dyeing, and finishing -0.311*** -0.289** 
 (0.092) (0.092) 
Metal processing -0.213* -0.244* 
 (0.097) (0.095) 
Fashion and garment -0.087 -0.089 
 (0.107) (0.106) 
Ceramics 0.739*** 0.726*** 
 (0.134) (0.133) 
Building materials 0.064 0.054 
 (0.117) (0.116) 
Established year (Ref. = 1979-1991)   
1992 – 1999 -0.037 -0.018 
 (0.073) (0.073) 
2000 – 2003 -0.106 -0.075 
 (0.089) (0.090) 
Ownership (Ref. = Collective owned)   
Private/family owned 0.005 0.075 
 (0.189) (0.190) 
FDI/Co.Ltd. 0.450* 0.497* 
 (0.203) (0.203) 
Has any affiliated enterprise (Yes=1) 0.314** 0.324** 
 (0.111) (0.110) 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) 0.546*** 0.549*** 
 (0.113) (0.113) 
% of employees with education above HS/VHS 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Entrepreneur attributes   
Age (year) 0.205 0.205 
 (0.113) (0.112) 
Male (Yes=1) 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Years of schooling 0.021 0.017 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Party membership (Yes=1) 0.374*** 0.311** 
 (0.094) (0.095) 
Job training experience (months) 0.006* 0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -0.633* -0.764* 
 (0.316) (0.317) 
Adjusted R-square 0.482 0.484 
^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; N=570 
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4.3 Relational Hypotheses of Performance 
 
Due to the fact that institutional legitimacy plays a significant role in predicting 
performance of SMEs, models in this section will include the institutional legitimacy 
variable as a statistical control in addition to enterprise and entrepreneur attributes.  In all 
models, each relational hypothesis will be tested using its continuous and dummy 
measures.  Possible curvilinear effects will also be tested by quadratic terms.   
This modeling strategy is suitable for this study.  First, relational hypotheses of 
performance proposed in Chapter 3 are hypotheses of linear effects where measures of 
particularism, multiplexity, and obligation are expected to promote performance in a 
linear manner.  These linear hypotheses can be falsified if there is any reversed U-shape 
relationship between guanxi measures and performance, which means that after certain 
thresholds increasing magnitudes of guanxi measures will start to harm performance.  
Second, dichotomous guanxi measures are tested so that OLS models in this chapter can 
be compared to counterfactual models in Chapter 5, where SMEs with lower-than-median 
guanxi measures will be treated as control-group observations and SMEs with greater-or-
equal-to-median measures will be used as treatment-group cases.  
Model 1(a) through Model 1(c) in Table 4–3 examines the effects of particularism on 
performance index (RH-1).  In Model 1(a), the continuous measure of particularism 
shows a positive (0.057) but statistically insignificant effect on performance index in a 
two-tailed test. However, if I conduct a directional test, then the effect of particularism is 
significant at p<0.05, one-tailed.  This result suggests that, other things equal, each unit 
increase in the measure of particularism makes the performance index increase by a 0.057 
unit on average.  Model 1(b) introduces a squared term of particularism and both the 
squared (-0.047, p<0.05) and linear (0.226, p<0.05) terms are significant.   
A significant and negative squared term in Model 1(b) seems to suggest a reversed U-
shape relation between particularism and performance index.  Particularism first 
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increases performance until it reaches 2.40418 when the predicted performance reaches its 
peak value.  Then further increasing of particularism will start to decrease performance.  
Such a result seems not fully supporting RH-1 where the hypothesized relationship is 
linear.  To better understand this inconsistency between observed data and RH-1, I depict 
this curvilinear relationship between particularism and performance in Figure 4–1 (long-
dash line).  In the same figure, I further include the linear fit based on Model 1(a) (solid 
line) and its 95% confidence interval (gray area surrounding the solid line) of the 
predicted mean performance for each given value of particularism.  It is clear that for 
most of the cases (depicted as solid dots), the curvilinear line falls into the 95% CI of 
linear predictions.  Only when particularism reaches its maximum value of 5, two 
extreme cases (dots a solid circle) drags the quadratic line slightly out of the 95% CI. 
Based on this graphical presentation, my assessment is that Model 1(a) and Model 1(b) 
are almost identical and this quadratic relationship can be ignored.  This assessment is 
supported by another two pieces of evidence.  First, the difference of adjusted r-squares 
between Model 1(a) (Q4 = 0.485) and Model 1(b) (Q4 = 0.490) is not statistically 
significant.  Second, a non-parametric Locally Weighted Scatterplot Smoothing 
(LOWESS) curve (dot-dash line in Figure 4–1) that is less sensitive to extreme cases 
(Cleveland, 1979; Cleveland & Devlin, 1988) remains within the 95% CI of the linear fit 
even when particularism reaches its maximum value.  
Model 1(c) tests significance of a dummy measure of particularism.  This dummy 
variable is coded “1” when continuous particularism measure is greater or equal to its 
median and it is coded “0” when particularism is less than its median.  Results from 
Model 1(c) show a significant effect of particularism on performance: all other things 
equal, SMEs with median and above-median levels of particularism perform significantly 
better (0.147, p<0.05) than similar SMEs with particularism lower than sample median.  
                                                
18	Let YZY[ = 2× −0.047 9 + 0.226 = 0 and solve the equation to obtain the first-order stationary point of 
particularism=2.404	
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Empirical results of Model 1 (a), (b), and (c) consistently support my RH-1 that all other 
things equal higher level of particularism leads to higher performance. 
 
Figure 4–1 Scatter plot, linear fit, 95% confidence interval of linear fit, quadratic fit, and LOWESS 
(bandwidth = 0.35) of performance index against particularism 
 
The same modeling strategy applies to tests of multiplexity (RH-2).  Model 2(a) in Table 
4–3 demonstrates a significant, positive, and linear effect of multiplexity on performance 
(0.193, p<0.001).  All other things equal, one unit increase in multiplexity will lead to 
0.193 unit increase in performance index.  SMEs with multifunctional ties perform better 
than similar SMEs embedded in social networks of simplex (or say function-specific) 
ties.  Model 2(b) includes a squared term of multiplexity measure and tries to capture 
possible curvilinear relationship.  The squared term of multiplexity fails to be significant 
at 0.05 level.  The lack of statistically significant quadratic effect of multiplexity is 
consistent with the prediction in RH-2.  
Finally, Model 2(c) tests the effect of multiplexity dummy on performance.  The 
multiplexity dummy equals to 1 when the continuous measure of multiplexity is greater 
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or equal to its median.  And this dummy is zero when multiplexity measure is less than its 
median.  Result shows that this multiplexity dummy is statistically significant (0.291, 
p<0.001).  Comparing to SMEs with multiplexity lower than median, SMEs higher level 
of multiplexity perform significantly better, ceteris paribus.  RH-2 is completely 
supported by observed data.  
To evaluate RH-3 that all other things equal, higher level of obligation leads to higher 
performance, Model 3(a), (b), and (c) are conducted.  Model 3(a) in Table 4–3 examines 
linear effect of obligation on performance. Significant and positive (0.065, p<0.01) result 
supports RH-3 clearly.  All other things equal, one unit increase in obligation will 
generate 0.065 unit increase in performance index on average.  That is to say that SMEs 
with guanxi ties high in mutual and reciprocal obligations to help each other perform 
significantly better.  Model 3(b) tries to detect possible reversed U-shape relationship 
between obligation and performance but it fails to show any statistically significant 
quadratic effect of obligation.  Model 3(c) replaces the continuous measure of obligation 
with its dummy measure.  The obligation dummy is defined as 1 when the continuous 
obligation measure is greater or equal to its own median. This dummy will be 0 when 
continuous obligation measure is less than its median.  Result indicates that controlling 
all other effects, SMEs enjoying median or above median level of obligated supports 
perform significantly better comparing to SMEs receiving less obligated supports.  RH-3 
is therefore fully supported.  
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Table 4–3 Models of Relational Hypotheses of Performance 
Performance Index (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c) 
Particularism          
Continuous measure 0.057 0.226**        
 (0.033) (0.075)        
Squared  -0.047*        
  (0.019)        
High in Particularism (Yes=1)   0.147*       
   (0.062)       
Multiplexity          
Continuous measure    0.193*** 0.368**     
    (0.040) (0.142)     
Squared     -0.082     
     (0.064)     
High in Multiplexity (Yes=1)      0.291***    
      (0.066)    
Obligation          
Continuous measure       0.065** 0.159  
       (0.025) (0.156)  
Squared        -0.011  
        (0.017)  
High in Obligation (Yes=1)         0.121* 
         (0.058) 
Institutional Legitimacy 0.110** 0.100** 0.103** 0.088* 0.082* 0.082* 0.110** 0.112** 0.110** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Enterprise attributes          
Industries (Ref. = Furniture)          
Textile, dyeing, and finishing -0.283** -0.276** -0.276** -0.316*** -0.294** -0.260** -0.309*** -0.309*** -0.303** 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) 
Metal processing -0.238* -0.210* -0.218* -0.247** -0.216* -0.190* -0.259** -0.262** -0.262** 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.093) (0.096) (0.094) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) 
Fashion and garment -0.082 -0.080 -0.086 -0.090 -0.091 -0.092 -0.116 -0.112 -0.103 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.106) (0.107) (0.106) 
Ceramics 0.731*** 0.734*** 0.738*** 0.713*** 0.731*** 0.755*** 0.704*** 0.700*** 0.707*** 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) 
Building materials 0.053 0.070 0.074 0.036 0.050 0.076 0.026 0.020 0.027 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.116) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) 
Established year (Ref. = 1979-1991)          
1992 – 1999 -0.020 -0.024 -0.023 -0.019 -0.026 -0.033 0.005 0.006 -0.005 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) 
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2000 – 2003 -0.098 -0.095 -0.095 -0.092 -0.095 -0.099 -0.053 -0.051 -0.061 
 (0.091) (0.090) (0.090) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
Ownership (Ref. = Collective owned)          
Private/family owned 0.081 0.077 0.087 0.140 0.144 0.115 0.007 -0.001 0.032 
 (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) (0.187) (0.187) (0.188) (0.191) (0.192) (0.191) 
FDI/Co.Ltd. 0.508* 0.501* 0.508* 0.518** 0.537** 0.525** 0.422* 0.415* 0.453* 
 (0.203) (0.202) (0.203) (0.199) (0.200) (0.200) (0.204) (0.205) (0.204) 
Has any affiliated enterprise (Yes=1) 0.314** 0.282* 0.286* 0.291** 0.293** 0.303** 0.301** 0.302** 0.298** 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.110) (0.111) (0.111) 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) 0.553*** 0.552*** 0.552*** 0.544*** 0.543*** 0.531*** 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.538*** 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) 
% of employees with education 
above HS/VHS 
0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entrepreneur attributes          
Age (year) 0.196 0.200 0.198 0.179 0.175 0.178 0.202 0.206 0.216 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
Male (Yes=1) -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Years of schooling 0.018 0.021 0.018 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.018 0.018 0.017 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Party membership (Yes=1) 0.330*** 0.328*** 0.330*** 0.353*** 0.357*** 0.344*** 0.291** 0.290** 0.296** 
 (0.096) (0.095) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) 
Job training experience (months) 0.006* 0.006 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -0.818* -0.965** -0.891** -1.032** -1.090*** -1.002** -0.996** -1.194** -0.806* 
 (0.319) (0.323) (0.321) (0.315) (0.318) (0.316) (0.329) (0.462) (0.318) 
Adjusted R-square 0.485 0.490 0.487 0.505 0.505 0.501 0.488 0.488 0.486 
^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; N = 570 
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4.4 Preliminary Conclusions 
 
OLS models in this chapter provide a conventional and straightforward set of empirical 
tests of non-relational and relational hypotheses.  Institutional legitimacy is a statistically 
significant non-relation explanation of business performance.  In China’s institutional 
context, SMEs having active CPC branches, maintaining formal unions, and using 
worker’s congress to solve critical agendas successfully align their internal management 
structure to external environment.  Such an alignment generates institutional legitimacy 
that will be rewarded by political protections and special policies.  As a result, 
performance increases can be expected. 
By controlling effects of enterprise and entrepreneur attributes as well as institutional 
advantage, OLS models in this chapter also strongly support all three relational 
hypotheses.  All other things equal, SMEs with guanxi network that are strong in 
interpersonal particularism, rich in multi-functional ties, and high in obligation perform 
better.  Social ties strong in sentimental particularism qualify focal entrepreneurs as core 
insiders in guanxi networks and entitle them to access to insider-only favors, such as 
time-sensitive business opportunities, accurate market information, low or no-interest 
financial supports, unique marketing channels, and etc.  Particular ties are difficult to 
establish and time-consuming to maintain.  Fortunately, multiplex nature of guanxi ties 
stacks multiple functions to a social tie so that entrepreneurs don’t have to establish k 
strong-ties for k different purposes.  Instead, only m guanxi ties are needed to fulfill k 
functions and m is considerably smaller than k.  SMEs rich in multifunctional ties are 
more efficient to utilize networks resources in business practices.  Finally, guanxi ties 
emphasizing moral obligations to provide reciprocal favors among network members 
provide an additional competitive advantage to SMEs.  The constant flow of favors and 
strong moral sanctions on opportunistic behaviors embed entrepreneurs into safety nets 
against unexpected risks and fluctuations of the market.  
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OLS models assume parallel causal effects of independent variables on the outcome 
variable.  As depicted in Figure 4–2 Panel A, performance is assumed to be determined, 
independently and directly, by attributes of enterprise and entrepreneurs and guanxi 
dimensions.  Using statistical terminology, both enterprise/entrepreneur attributes and 
guanxi dimensions are strict exogenous reasons in models of performance.  The 
assumption of parallel causality may be violated.  One violation is suggested by Mouw 
(2003) and illustrated in Panel B of Figure 4–2.  Mouw suggests that in observational 
studies, observed status of social capital measures are not randomly assigned to 
respondents.  Instead, strategic self-selections based on people’s free will and rational 
choices tend to determine values of social capital measures.  Applying Mouw’s 
suggestion to my study, I have to assume that observed status of particularism, 
multiplexity, and obligation are determined entrepreneurs’ personal attributes and 
intrinsic characteristics of their businesses.  When enterprise and entrepreneur attributes 
are reasons for guanxi measures and performance simultaneously, the causal path from 
guanxi to performance will be spurious. To response to this challenge of causality, 
Chapter 5 makes further refinements and adjustments to models in Table 4–3 using 
techniques of counterfactual analysis.  
 
 
Panel A Panel B 
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Chapter 5 Counterfactual Models 
 
To reassess the relational explanations tested in the previous chapter with greater 
analytical rigor and statistical sophistication, this chapter presents the results about causal 
effects of guanxi measures on performance index by addressing the guanxi endogeneity 
problem in a counterfactual framework.  This chapter starts with a brief introduction to 
basic concepts and terminologies of counterfactual analysis, and then it moves to four 
counterfactual techniques that evaluate causal effects of particularism (RH-1), 
multiplexity (RH-2), and obligation (RH-3) on performance of SMEs.  Finally, I will 
conduct rigorous regression diagnostics to detect and resolve other possible violations of 
OLS assumptions (such as influential outliers, normality, and homoscedasticity).  This 
additional step of model refinement puts my conclusions on a much stronger statistical 
basis.  
 
5.1 Concepts and Terminologies of Counterfactual Analysis 
 
OLS models in Chapter 4 lend empirical supports to all three relational hypotheses of 
performance under the assumption of parallel causality.  In Chapter 4, OLS models are 
defined as Equation 5-119 
 
 ! = # + %& + '( + ) Equation 5-1 
 
where Y is the dependent variable of performance index, an *×1 column vector for n 
valid cases; X is an *×- matrix containing k control variables including enterprise 
                                                
19	This chapter uses symbols according to the convention of counterfactual analysis.  The dependent 
variable is denoted as Y.  Control variables are columns of matrix X.  Accent tilde (~) means “a strict subset 
of”; matrix % contains some but not all columns of matrix X.  Continuous and dichotomous independent 
variables are denoted by d and w, respectively.  Superscript asterisk (*) means “a latent variable of”; w* is 
the unobserved latent variable of w.  Greek letters are parameters of regression models.		
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attributes, entrepreneur attributes, and measures of institutional legitimacy; d is the 
independent variable of guanxi measures (particularism, multiplexity, or obligation); # is 
the constant term; & is a -×1 coefficient vector for control variables; ' is the coefficient 
for the independent variable d; and )~/ 0, 234  is the error term following a normal 
distribution with mean of zero and a constant variance of 23.  
Equation 5-1 assumes that (1) independent variable d is an exogenous reason for the 
dependent variable and there is no correlation among components on the right-hand side 
of Equation 5-1; (2) values of independent variable d are randomly acquired and there is 
no endogenous self-selection process to jeopardize the randomness of d.  Such an 
assumption, as discussed in Chapter 3, is highly possible to be violated.  OLS models 
with violation of exogenous assumption generate biased estimates of causal effects of 
guanxi measures on performance.  
Counterfactual models try to solve this problem.  To conduct counterfactual analyses, 
continuous independent variable d in Equation 5-1 has to be replaced by its dummy form.  
I use w to denote dichotomized independent variable d.  For particularism, I assign w=1 
to SMEs with median or higher-than-median level of particularism and assign w=0 to 
SMEs with less-than-median level of particularism.  To another two guanxi measures, 
multiplexity and obligation, the same coding scheme applies.  In the counterfactual 
terminology, w is called the “status of treatment assignment”.  Cases in the “treatment 
group” have w=1 and cases in the “control group” have w=0.  And 56 denotes the 
observed treatment assignment status for the ith case.  Variables that determine both w 
and Y simultaneously are called confounders and are denoted as %.  Models regressing w 
on % are called selection models.  The predicted probability of 56 is the propensity score 
(denoted as ps) of belonging to the treatment group for the ith case.  
Models regressing Y on X and w are outcome models.  An outcome model defines the 
causal effect using the idea of potential outcomes.  For case i, we say a treatment 
assignment 56 is causally determining outcome !6 if and only if we observe none-zero 
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76 = !68 − !6:, where 76 is the causal effect of w on case i, !68 refers to the outcome of 
case i after it received the treatment 56; !6: refers to the outcome of case i if the same 
case had not received the treatment 56.  For any case in the analytic sample what I can 
observe is either !68 or !6:, or say !6 = !6856 + !68 1 − 56 .  If I observe !68 when 56 = 1, 
then !6: will be the potential outcome for case i.  If I observe !;: when 5; = 0, then !;8 
will be the potential outcome for case j.  The expectation of all !68, denoted as < !68 , is 
an estimate of mean outcome for the entire population if everyone in this population 
receives treatment w.  Similarly, < !6:  is the estimated mean for the entire population if 
no one in this population receives treatment w.  The causal effect of w for the entire 
population, denoted as ∆, is then defined as Equation 5-2 
 
 ∆= >8 − >: = < !68 − < !6:  Equation 5-2 
 
In a random experiment, it is true that outcomes of the experiment, !: or !8, is 
statistically independent from how cases are chosen into treatment and control groups: !8, !:  w20.  Such a statistical independence guarantees following reasoning: 
Given !8, !:  w, 
< !|5 = 1 = < !85 + !: 1 − 5 |5 = 1 = < !8|5 = 1 = < !8  
and 
< !|5 = 0 = < !85 + !: 1 − 5 |5 = 0 = < !:|5 = 0 = < !:  
Therefore, the population causal effect of w can be obtained from this experiment since < !|5 = 1 − < !|5 = 0 = < !8 − < !: = ∆. 
                                                
20	To simplify further discussions, subscript i will be omitted whenever there is no confusion about 
omitting this subscript.		
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However, in an observational data with confounded treatment assignment, we have !8, !:   w. So that,  
< !|5 = 1 ≠ < !8  < !|5 = 0 ≠ < !:  ⟹ B = < !|5 = 1 − < !|5 = 0 ≠ ∆ 
The difference between B and ∆ is the bias of estimating causal effect of w on Y using 
observational data. 
To eliminate the bias, counterfactual analysis identifies all confounders % ∈ % and 
generates a conditional independence of !8, !:  w|%, so that we can have: 
< < !|5 = 1, % = < < !8|5 = 1, % = < < !8|% = < !8  
< < !|5 = 0, % = < < !:|5 = 0, % = < < !:|% = < !:  
Therefore, 
< !8 − < !: = < < !8|5 = 1, % − < < !:|5 = 0, % = ∆ 
This is the definition of average treatment effect (ATE) in the counterfactual framework, 
an unbiased estimate of causal effect of w on Y: 
 DE< = < !8|5 = 1 − !:|5 = 0 |%  Equation 5-3 
 
In this research, ATE is the effect of a guanxi measure on the performance for the entire 
SME population in the PRD area.  As a related concept, the average treatment effect for 
the treated (ATT) is defined in Equation 5-4.  
 DEE = < !8 − !: |%, 5 = 1  Equation 5-4 
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ATT shows another flavor of causal effect of w.  It denotes the difference between the 
observed outcomes of members in the treatment group after they are treated by w and 
potential outcomes when these treatment group members were not exposed to the 
treatment of w (Guo & Fraser, 2010).  In this research ATT means the difference between 
the performance of SMEs with median or higher-than-median value of a guanxi measure 
and the potential performance outcome of the same group of SMEs if they had lower than 
median value of that guanxi measure.  ATE is the major concern for this research.  
Whenever it is possible, ATT will also be calculated as an auxiliary statistic to double-
check the reliability of conclusions derived from ATEs. 
Finally, counterfactual models in this chapter assume that there are no unobserved 
confounders.  That is to say that we assume that all reasons determining treatment 
assignments w and Y are observed in the data and are included in selection models as %.  
Whether this assumption is true or not is beyond the scope of this research and it is a very 
tough and an ultimate question for any social science research using observational data. 
Like most of counterfactual analyses in the current literature, this research takes this 
assumption for granted.  
 
5.2 Testing Relational Hypotheses with Treatment Effect Models 
 
The treatment effect model follows Heckman’s econometric tradition that transforms a 
selection-bias problem to an omitted-variable bias problem (Maddala, 1983).  This 
method is more feasible than using instrumental variable21.  Treatment effect model 
reaches ATE by explicitly modeling how an endogenous treatment assignment w is 
                                                
21	An instrumental variable (IV) is an observed variable that is highly correlated with the problematic 
independent variable suffering from endogeneity but at the same time statistically independent from the 
error term in Equation 5-1.  The advantage of using an IV is that it is possible to keep the continuous 
measure of the endogenous independent variable in models.  The drawback of using an IV is that it is very 
difficult to justify any observed variable as an IV.  This method is not conducted in this research. 	
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causally determined by confounders %.  In this research, the outcome model is defined as 
Equation 5-5. 
 ! = # + %& + 56' + ) Equation 5-5 
And the selection model predicting the treatment assignment of w is defined as Equation 
5-6.  
 5∗ = G + %H + I Equation 5-6 
where 5∗ is a latent variable determining observed status of w: if 5∗ > 0 then w=1; if 5∗ ≤ 0 then w=0; G is the constant term; H is a L×* column vector for L	(L ≤ -) 
confounders in %, and u is the error term following normal distribution.  With the 
definition of Equation 5-6, the conditional probabilities of observing w=1 can be written 
like Equation 5-722: 
 PQ = RSTU 5 = 1|% = Φ %H  Equation 5-7 RSTU 5 = 1|%  is the propensity score (ps) representing the tendency of belonging to 
the treatment group. Φ ∙  is the cumulative normal distribution function (Normal CDF). 
Treatment effect model assumes that the error terms ) in outcome model (Equation 5-5) 
and the error term u in selection model (Equation 5-6) follow a bivariate normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a covariance matrix of 
2X YY 1 , where 2X is a 
constant variance of error term ) in Equation 5-5 and Y is the correlation between two 
error terms.  In Stata, parameters of Equation 5-5 and Equation 5-6 are estimated by 
maximum likelihood.  And a Z3 test of [:: Y = 0 is conducted to evaluate adequacy of 
model specification.  When the null hypothesis [: can be rejected, the model 
specification is adequate. 
Models 1 through 3 in Table 5–1 summarize ATE of particularism, multiplexity, and 
obligation on performance index, respectively.  Results in Table 5–1 fail to support any 
                                                
22	Probit model is used as selection model in this research.  But it is completely adequate to model the 
selection by Logit models.		
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relational hypothesis and suggest no causal relation between guanxi dimensions and 
performance.  
Z3 tests of model specification are needed before I can conclude the lack of guanxi 
effects on performance.  Last row of Table 5–1 shows Z3 statistics and significance for 
parameter Y.  It is clear that for all three models Z3 statistics are not significantly 
different from zero.  This indicates misspecification of the selection model, which makes 
the insignificant guanxi effects misleading. 
The treatment effect model is very sensitive to model misspecifications.  Any 
misspecification in the outcome and/or selection models will make parameter estimates 
biased and invalidate hypothesis tests (Guo & Fraser, 2010).  As a pioneering study of 
endogenous guanxi effects on performance, I have to face a lack of empirical knowledge 
of the selection process of w in current literature.  There is also no useful theoretical 
guideline for this research to answer the following two critical questions on Equation 5-6: 
(1) do I include all possible confounders and their interaction terms and (2) what are the 
correct functional transformations the selection model?  Other counterfactual methods are 
needed to solve this problem.  
Table 5–1 Treatment effect models for causal effects of three guanxi dimensions on SME 
performance index (see full table in Appendix A)23 
Performance Index (1) (2) (3) 
High in Particularism (Yes=1) 0.005   
 (0.652)   
High in Multiplexity (Yes=1)  0.420  
  (0.721)  
High in Obligation (Yes=1)   0.456 
   (0.540) 
Hyperbolic tangent of ] 0.133 -0.122 -0.321 
 (0.612) (0.678) (0.519) 
^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; N = 570 
  
                                                
23	R-squares can not be defined for models estimated by maximum likelihood method.	
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5.3 Testing Relational Hypotheses with Doubly Robust Estimators 
 
One solution to the aforementioned model misspecification is “doubly robust estimator” 
(DRE) (see technical details in Funk, Westreich, Davidian, & Wiesen, 2010; Guo & 
Fraser, 2010; Robins, Rotnitzky, & Zhao, 1994).  Like the treatment effect model, DRE 
explicitly models selection process of w.  The substantial advantage of DRE is that if 
either the outcome or the selection model is free from misspecification, then estimates of 
endogenous guanxi effect will be consistent (asymptotically unbiased when sample size 
is large enough).  That is a desired feature for this research.  Even if I don’t know the 
correct equation for the selection model, I do know, under the guideline of theories, a 
very plausible outcome model.  Therefore, using DRE I can still get causal effects of 
guanxi measures on performance index.  Technical details of this doubly robust feature 
are included in Appendix B. 
In practice, DRE is implemented by a family of similar methods.  In this research, I use 
the algorithm of “Inverse-Probability-Weighted Regression Adjustment (IPWRA)”, a 
built-in feature of Stata Version 13, to obtain doubly robust estimator of each guanxi 
measure.  Using IPWRA, both ATE and ATT of guanxi effects can be calculated and are 
presented in Table 5–2.  
Model (1a) in Table 5–2 shows a significant and positive effect of particularism on 
performance (0.169, p<0.01).  Comparing to SMEs with similar enterprise and 
entrepreneur attributes but lower particularism, SMEs with median and higher-than-
median level of particularism perform significantly better.  This finding supports my RH-
1.  And this conclusion is further confirmed by ATT in Model (1b) (0.190, p<0.01) that if 
SMEs with observed high-level particularism were assigned low particularism status then 
their performance index would be 0.190 unit lower on average.  Model (2a) examines 
causal effect of multiplexity on performance.  Result shows that comparing to SMEs with 
similar attributes, SMEs high in multiplexity perform significantly better (0.208, p<0.01).  
RH-2 is supported.  The ATT in Model (2b) reassure this conclusion (0.188, p<0.05).  
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Model (3a) and (3b) show the significant causal effect of obligation on performance 
(0.133, p<0.05), which support RH-3.  
Models using DRE support all three relational explanations of performance.  The doubly 
robust nature of DRE provides a better solution than the treatment effect model, yet as a 
model-based adjustment of endogeneity DRE is still not a completely satisfactory 
solution when severe misspecification of selection models cannot be fully corrected.  
Data-based methods in the counterfactual framework are needed to further confirm 
conclusions of guanxi effects on performance. 
Table 5–2 Inverse-Probability-Weighted Regression Adjustment (IPWRA) models for causal effects 
of three guanxi dimensions on SME performance index (see full table in Appendix A)24 
Performance Index (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) ATE ATT ATE ATT ATE ATT 
High in Particularism (Yes=1) 0.169** 0.190**     
 (0.060) (0.064)     
High in Multiplexity (Yes=1)   0.208** 0.188*   
   (0.075) (0.087)   
High in Obligation (Yes=1)     0.113* 0.112^ 
     (0.057) (0.062) 
^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; N = 570 
 
5.4 Testing Relational Hypotheses with Propensity-Weighted Data 
 
To overcome the misspecification of selection models, the Generalized Boost Model 
(GBM) is conducted to estimate propensity scores.  The GBM as a machine learning 
method has a significant advantage over parametric Probit models: it is an artificial 
intellectual technique using regression tree and automatically identifies optimal linear and 
nonlinear functional transformations as well as interactions of confounders % so that the 
predicted propensity scores can be very accurate.  Appendix C summarizes confounders 
that are automatically identified by GBM as most important predictors for each 
endogenous guanxi measure. 
                                                
24	R-squares can not be defined for models estimated by maximum likelihood method.	
  74 
The missing randomness of treatment assignment w can be restored by weighting analytic 
samples with ps.  After weighting, cases with similar values on enterprise and 
entrepreneur attributes will carry higher weights while cases with dissimilar values on 
these confounders have lower weights.  By doing so, the weighted data show less 
systematical difference in confounders across treatment status and cases with similar 
confounding attributes will dominate regression results25.  That is to say that when 
sample size is large, regression models using propensity-score-weighted data can reveal 
consistent causal effects of w just like what a random experiment data can do (Guo & 
Fraser, 2010).  
Model (1a) in Table 5–3 supports RH-1 with a significant ATE of particularism on 
performance index (0.142, p<0.05).  SMEs that are high in particularism perform 
significantly better.  ATT in Model (1b) further assure this conclusion (0.144, p<0.05).  
Model (2a) shows support to RH-2 that SMEs with high level of multiplexity perform 
better (0.275, p<0.001).  And this conclusion is further backed up by ATT in Model (2b) 
(0.275, p<0.001).  Finally, Model (3a) supports RH-3 with a significant ATE of 
obligation (0.112, p<0.05) and an ATT of 0.118 (p<0.05) in Model (3b).  
 
Table 5–3 Propensity-score-weighted regression models for causal effects of three guanxi dimensions 
on SME performance index (see full table in Appendix A) 
Performance Index (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) ATE ATT ATE ATT ATE ATT 
High in Particularism (Yes=1) 0.142* 0.144*     
 (0.062) (0.062)     
High in Multiplexity (Yes=1)   0.275*** 0.275***   
   (0.067) (0.068)   
High in Obligation (Yes=1)     0.112* 0.118* 
     (0.057) (0.057) 
Adjusted R-square 0.473 0.472 0.514 0.518 0.479 0.480 
^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; N = 570 
 
                                                
25	Technical details of how to assign weights to cases are included in Appendix D.	
  75 
All relational hypotheses are consistently supported by regression models using 
propensity-weighted data.  However, I have to consider a drawback of this method: 
weights that deviate far from 1 will introduce unintended problem to regression models.  
Appendix E summarizes weights used in above models.  It is clear that maximum weights 
for ATE and ATT of particularism reach 3.992 and 2.992 respectively; maximum weights 
for ATE and ATT of multiplexity reach 5.278 and 4.278 respectively.  Therefore, 
conclusions derived from these regression models need further confirmations.  
 
5.5 Testing Relational Hypotheses with Propensity-Matched Data 
 
Propensity matching is another way to restore randomness to guanxi measures w.  This 
method is substantially different from previous three methods.  Once propensity scores 
are obtained from GBM, observed cases in the treatment and control groups sharing very 
similar propensity scores are matched together.  Cases in the treatment group with 
propensity scores that are not similar to any cases in the control group will be pruned.  In 
this way, a new data with smaller sample size is generated.  Since propensity score is an 
confounder-balancing score, two cases, one from the treatment group and one from the 
control group, with similar propensity scores will also have almost identical values on 
confounders %.  In a propensity-score-matched data, therefore, confounders % and 
treatment assignment w are statistically independent from each other so that estimates of 
ATEs using matched data are causal effects because except for the difference in treatment 
assignments w, there is no systematical difference in any confounding attributes.  
There are different ways to achieve propensity-score matching.  I use the 1-to-1 nearest-
neighbor matching with a preset clipper, a quantitative definition of “similar propensity 
scores”, to implement matching.  Following the convention, I set the clipper to be one-
forth of the standard deviation of predicted propensity score, which is believed to be an 
optimal choice (Guo & Fraser, 2010).  
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Two methods are used to demonstrate that there is no systematical difference in 
confounding attributes after propensity matching.  The first method is independent-
sample T-test.  Using the treatment variable as the grouping variable, a T-tests detects 
mean difference of confounding attributes between cases in treatment and control groups.  
What I expect to see is significant T-test results using unmatched data and insignificant 
T-test results using matched data.  The second method is an overall propensity-balancing 
test based on pseudo-R-square of Logistic regression.  In a Logistic model, set the 
treatment assignment w as the dependent variable and set confounders % as independent 
variables.  Run this Logistic model using unmatched data.  Since w can be very well 
predicted by %, the pseudo-R-square tends to be large.  Run the same Logistic model 
again but using matched data, where % is balanced across w.  So, I expect to see a very 
low or almost zero pseudo-R-square.  If the pseudo-R-square reduces across data, then 
balancing of % across w via propensity matching is achieved.  
Table 5–4 summarizes T-test results of % before and after propensity matching for the 
treatment dummy of particularism.  It is very clear that attributes like belonging to 
machinery industry and has affiliated enterprise(s) in unmatched data show significant 
between-group mean difference.  And that significant difference disappears in the 
matched data.  That is to say that the only systematic difference left in this matched data 
is the dummy variable of high in particularism.  Table 5–5 shows the pseudo-R-squared for 
Logistic model of treatment assignment on % is 0.037 (p<0.01) using unmatched data.  
This measure reduced to almost zero (and statistically insignificant) using matched data.  
These two tests consistently show that the matched data effectively eliminates between-
group difference in %.  Therefore, regression models using this matched data can reach 
causal effect of particularism on performance index free from confoundedness.  






T-test of group mean 
difference after 
matching 
High Low High Low t p>|t| 
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Enterprise attributes       
Industries        
Textile, dyeing, and finishing 0.234 0.319 0.235 0.225 0.39 0.700 
Metal processing 0.202 0.280 0.203 0.205 -0.06 0.950 
Fashion and garment 0.155 0.103 0.151 0.165 -0.62 0.536 
Ceramics 0.150 0.123 0.151 0.153 -0.09 0.926 
Building materials 0.110 0.098 0.111 0.108 0.14 0.891 
Established year        
1992 – 1999 0.546 0.505 0.550 0.549 0.03 0.976 
2000 – 2003 0.247 0.260 0.249 0.255 -0.23 0.818 
Ownership        
Private/family owned 0.826 0.863 0.831 0.829 0.06 0.955 
FDI/Co.Ltd. 0.133 0.118 0.132 0.138 -0.29 0.771 
Has any affiliated enterprise (Yes=1) 0.125 0.069 0.119 0.118 0.04 0.970 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) 0.107 0.059 0.102 0.010 0.14 0.891 
% of employees with education 
above HS/VHS 
16.713 13.613 16.676 17.222 -0.37 0.714 
Entrepreneur attributes       
Age (year) 0.938 0.941 0.938 0.931 0.45 0.656 
Male (Yes=1) 40.514 42.49 40.550 40.487 0.12 0.907 
Years of schooling 11.473 10.706 11.452 11.415 0.21 0.833 
Party membership (Yes=1) 0.157 0.152 0.158 0.161 -0.14 0.889 
Job training experience (months) 5.012 4.075 4.982 4.935 0.06 0.954 
 
Table 5–7 demonstrate how % is effectively balanced in the matched data for treatment 
assignment of multiplexity.  All T-tests for mean difference of % using the matched data 
show insignificant results.  And pseudo-R-squared for the Logistic model is almost zero 
and statistically insignificant using the matched data.  The matched data effectively 
removes between-group difference in %.  And regression models using this matched data 
can get causal effect of multiplexity on performance index.  Same logic applies to % 






T-test of group mean 
difference after 
matching 
High Low High Low t p>|t| 
Enterprise attributes       
Industries        
Textile, dyeing, and finishing 0.247 0.270 0.251 0.266 -0.48 0.629 
Metal processing 0.247 0.194 0.248 0.275 -0.85 0.394 
Fashion and garment 0.132 0.152 0.134 0.128 0.24 0.809 
Ceramics 0.156 0.124 0.149 0.141 0.33 0.739 
Building materials 0.117 0.094 0.117 0.107 0.45 0.654 
Established year        
1992 – 1999 0.521 0.552 0.524 0.498 0.72 0.473 
2000 – 2003 0.237 0.267 0.238 0.252 -0.46 0.648 
Ownership        
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Private/family owned 0.858 0.809 0.856 0.860 -0.18 0.860 
FDI/Co.Ltd. 0.115 0.145 0.117 0.102 0.66 0.509 
Has any affiliated enterprise (Yes=1) 0.134 0.079 0.122 0.117 0.20 0.845 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) 0.108 0.076 0.099 0.084 0.74 0.458 
% of employees with education above 
HS/VHS 
17.442 13.893 17.131 16.965 0.10 0.922 
Entrepreneur attributes       
Age (year) 0.927 0.955 0.926 0.915 0.56 0.579 
Male (Yes=1) 40.836 41.336 40.839 40.895 -0.09 0.928 
Years of schooling 11.330 11.176 11.283 11.386 -0.51 0.607 
Party membership (Yes=1) 0.193 0.109 0.184 0.172 0.44 0.660 
Job training experience (months) 3.969 5.725 3.978 3.604 0.49 0.625 
 
Table 5–9 show that the matched data successfully balances %.  And that matched data can 
show causal effect of obligation on performance.  
 
Table 5–4 Heterogeneity in attributes of entrepreneurs and enterprises before and after propensity 






T-test of group mean 
difference after 
matching 
High Low High Low t p>|t| 
Enterprise attributes       
Industries        
Textile, dyeing, and finishing 0.254 0.264 0.256 0.241 0.55 0.583 
Metal processing 0.192 0.289 0.195 0.203 -0.31 0.757 
Fashion and garment 0.158 0.105 0.148 0.147 0.04 0.967 
Ceramics 0.150 0.126 0.150 0.158 -0.31 0.758 
Building materials 0.102 0.117 0.104 0.110 -0.30 0.764 
Established year        
1992 – 1999 0.544 0.515 0.547 0.534 0.40 0.689 
2000 – 2003 0.258 0.234 0.258 0.262 -0.14 0.888 
Ownership        
Private/family owned 0.838 0.833 0.841 0.837 0.20 0.838 
FDI/Co.Ltd. 0.124 0.138 0.126 0.124 0.11 0.914 
Has any affiliated enterprise (Yes=1) 0.138 0.050 0.124 0.126 -0.08 0.939 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) 0.096 0.088 0.094 0.098 -0.25 0.805 
% of employees with education above 
HS/VHS 
16.200 15.140 16.098 16.444 -0.22 0.823 
Entrepreneur attributes       
Age (year) 0.942 0.933 0.941 0.947 -0.38 0.707 
Male (Yes=1) 40.850 41.498 40.915 40.864 0.09 0.928 
Years of schooling 11.282 11.218 11.238 11.197 0.23 0.821 
Party membership (Yes=1) 0.148 0.172 0.148 0.144 0.18 0.855 
Job training experience (months) 4.945 4.353 4.753 4.420 0.41 0.681 
 
Table 5–5 Overall propensity-balancing test for particularism 
Sample from Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 
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Raw data 0.037 34.45 0.007 
Matched data 0.001 1.89 1.000 
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Table 5–6 Heterogeneity in attributes of entrepreneurs and enterprises before and after propensity 






T-test of group mean 
difference after 
matching 
High Low High Low t p>|t| 
Enterprise attributes       
Industries        
Textile, dyeing, and finishing 0.234 0.319 0.235 0.225 0.39 0.700 
Metal processing 0.202 0.280 0.203 0.205 -0.06 0.950 
Fashion and garment 0.155 0.103 0.151 0.165 -0.62 0.536 
Ceramics 0.150 0.123 0.151 0.153 -0.09 0.926 
Building materials 0.110 0.098 0.111 0.108 0.14 0.891 
Established year        
1992 – 1999 0.546 0.505 0.550 0.549 0.03 0.976 
2000 – 2003 0.247 0.260 0.249 0.255 -0.23 0.818 
Ownership        
Private/family owned 0.826 0.863 0.831 0.829 0.06 0.955 
FDI/Co.Ltd. 0.133 0.118 0.132 0.138 -0.29 0.771 
Has any affiliated enterprise (Yes=1) 0.125 0.069 0.119 0.118 0.04 0.970 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) 0.107 0.059 0.102 0.010 0.14 0.891 
% of employees with education 
above HS/VHS 
16.713 13.613 16.676 17.222 -0.37 0.714 
Entrepreneur attributes       
Age (year) 0.938 0.941 0.938 0.931 0.45 0.656 
Male (Yes=1) 40.514 42.49 40.550 40.487 0.12 0.907 
Years of schooling 11.473 10.706 11.452 11.415 0.21 0.833 
Party membership (Yes=1) 0.157 0.152 0.158 0.161 -0.14 0.889 
Job training experience (months) 5.012 4.075 4.982 4.935 0.06 0.954 
 
Table 5–7 Overall propensity-balancing test for multiplexity 
Sample from Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 
Raw data 0.044 38.54 0.002 
Matched data 0.001 1.23 1.000 
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Table 5–8 Heterogeneity in attributes of entrepreneurs and enterprises before and after propensity 






T-test of group mean 
difference after 
matching 
High Low High Low t p>|t| 
Enterprise attributes       
Industries        
Textile, dyeing, and finishing 0.247 0.270 0.251 0.266 -0.48 0.629 
Metal processing 0.247 0.194 0.248 0.275 -0.85 0.394 
Fashion and garment 0.132 0.152 0.134 0.128 0.24 0.809 
Ceramics 0.156 0.124 0.149 0.141 0.33 0.739 
Building materials 0.117 0.094 0.117 0.107 0.45 0.654 
Established year        
1992 – 1999 0.521 0.552 0.524 0.498 0.72 0.473 
2000 – 2003 0.237 0.267 0.238 0.252 -0.46 0.648 
Ownership        
Private/family owned 0.858 0.809 0.856 0.860 -0.18 0.860 
FDI/Co.Ltd. 0.115 0.145 0.117 0.102 0.66 0.509 
Has any affiliated enterprise (Yes=1) 0.134 0.079 0.122 0.117 0.20 0.845 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) 0.108 0.076 0.099 0.084 0.74 0.458 
% of employees with education above 
HS/VHS 
17.442 13.893 17.131 16.965 0.10 0.922 
Entrepreneur attributes       
Age (year) 0.927 0.955 0.926 0.915 0.56 0.579 
Male (Yes=1) 40.836 41.336 40.839 40.895 -0.09 0.928 
Years of schooling 11.330 11.176 11.283 11.386 -0.51 0.607 
Party membership (Yes=1) 0.193 0.109 0.184 0.172 0.44 0.660 
Job training experience (months) 3.969 5.725 3.978 3.604 0.49 0.625 
 
Table 5–9 Overall propensity-balancing test for obligation 
Sample from Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 
Raw data 0.051 51.97 0.000 
Matched data 0.005 5.35 0.997 
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Using matched data, OLS regressions are conducted to test the true causal effects of 
guanxi dimensions to performance.  Model 1 in Table 5–10 confirms the causal statement 
in RH-1.  Comparing to SMEs with low particularism, SMEs enjoying high level of 
particularism perform significantly better (0.142, p<0.05).  Model 2 strongly supports the 
causal reasoning in RH-2 that comparing to similar SMEs, SMEs with high level of 
multiplexity perform significantly better (0.285, p<0.001).  Finally, Model 3 supports the 
causal effect of obligation on performance (0.157, p<0.05) as what is predicted by RH-3.  
Table 5–10 OLS regression models for causal effects of three guanxi dimensions on SME 
performance index using propensity-score-matched data (see full table in Appendix A)  
Performance Index (1) (2) (3) 
High in Particularism (Yes=1) 0.142*   
 (0.070)   
High in Multiplexity (Yes=1)  0.285***  
  (0.078)  
High in Obligation (Yes=1)   0.157* 
   (0.066) 
Adjusted R-square 0.479 0.523 0.465 
N 342 325 439 
^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
5.6 Regression Diagnostics of Models with Propensity-Matched Data 
 
Models in Table 5–10 fully support all three relational explanations of performance.  The 
endogeneity issue of guanxi measures is effectively solved in this counterfactual 
framework.  Regression models using matched data, however, are by nature OLS models 
that carry strong assumptions in addition to the parallel causality assumption.  In this 
section, I conduct regression diagnostics on Model 1 through 3 in Table 5–10 and then 
refine these models by excluding most influential outliers and calculating robust standard 
errors to make my conclusions more conservative.  
 
5.6.1 Diagnostics of particularism model 
 
OLS estimates are sensitive to extreme cases.  Left panel of Figure 5–1 illustrates Cook’s 
distance, a measure of abnormality, against case ID number.  In all 342 cases, case #167 
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has the highest Cook’s distance.  Right panel of Figure 5–1 is an influence plot including 
studentized residual as vertical axis, hat-value as horizontal axis26, and Cook’s distance as 
the diameter of circles. It is clear that case #167 has very large residual, the largest 
Cook’s distance, and a very strong influence on estimates.  It is the outlier case that will 
be remove from Model 1.  
 
Figure 5–1 Cook’s Plot and Influence Plot for observation with largest Cook’s distance 
 
The assumption of error term following normal distribution with zero mean and constant 
variance is very critical for reliable hypothesis testing of regression parameters.  Two 
panels in Figure 5–2 depict cumulative distribution function (a Q-Q plot) and probability 
                                                
26	Hat-value comes from the diagonal of H matrix in OLS which is defined as [ = % %^% _8%^.  Values ℎ66 in H are also called leverage values and cases with larger leverages tend to dominate estimates more 
heavily. 	
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density function of studentized residuals (histogram with normal distribution reference 
lines).  The Q-Q plot in the left panel of Figure 5–2 shows no noticeable deviation between 
the cumulative distribution of residuals (circles in the Q-Q plot) and the normal CDF 
(solid line reference line in the Q-Q plot).  Most residuals locate very close to the normal 
reference line and normality assumption is not violated.  Right panel of Figure 5–2 further 
confirms this conclusion and it also shows that the mean of studentized residuals is very 
close to zero (further T-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that mean studentized 
residual is zero, t=0.0001<tc.v.=1.96).  To sum up, residuals of Model 1 follow normal 
distribution with mean of zero.  
 
Figure 5–2 Checking normality with cumulative and density distribution plots of studentized 
residuals 
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The error term in an OLS model also needs to follow a constant variance across the entire 
regression surface. Violation of this assumption of homoscedasticity will not generate 
biased coefficients but it causes inaccurate estimate of standard errors of coefficients so 
that hypothesis testing of any coefficient against zero will be affected. 
It is possible to detect violation of this assumption using graphs.  The left panel of Figure 
5–3 is a plot of studentized residual vs. model predicted performance index.  If 
homoscedasticity assumption holds, then scatters in this graph are randomly and evenly 
distributed.  It is clear, however, that (1) scatters concentrate around zero (shown by the 
dash reference line) when predicted values of performance index are small; (2) points on 
this panel show wider dispersion when predicted values of dependent variable get larger. 
This pattern depicts a violation of homoscedasticity and further Chi-square test of 
homoscedasticity assumption turns out to be significant (Chi-square = 5.962, df=1, 
p<0.05).  When facing heterscedasticity, there are two commonly used solutions.  First, 
certain functional transformation of dependent variable can be helpful; second, robust 
standard errors for coefficients should be used if there is neither clear pattern in residual-
predicted value plot nor useful function transformation.  One minus the slope of the solid 
line in the spread-level plot27 (right panel of Figure 5–3) can be a possible power 
transformation of dependent variable to solve this non-constant variance problem.  The 
slope of the solid line in the spread-level plot is almost zero, so there are no further useful 
transformations other than Y in its linear form.  The only solution left is to use robust 
standard errors in testing regression coefficients28.  
 
                                                
27	When drawing spread-level plot, cases with negative predicted performance index will be excluded and 
negative studentized residuals are transformed to their absolute values.		
28 In Stata 13, the robust standard error matrix for all regression parameters is calculated by a. <.cdefgh =%i% _8 j6k6 i j6k6l6m8 %i% _8, where %i is the transpose of the matrix X containing all right-hand-
side variables; n is the analytic sample size; j6 is the residual for ith case; and k6 is the vector containing all 
independent variables and constant for the ith case (source: 
http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/statistics/standard-errors-and-vce-cluster-option/). 
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Figure 5–3 Checking non-constant error variance (heteroscedasticity)  
 
5.6.2 Diagnostics of multiplexity model 
 
Similar diagnostics apply to Model 2 in Table 5–10.  Cook’s distance plot and influence 
plot in Figure 5–4 identify two outliers that have strongest influence on model estimates, 
case #165 and #304.  These two cases will be excluded.  
  87 
 
Figure 5–4 Cook’s Plot and Influence Plot for observation with largest Cook’s distance  
 
Figure 5–5 checks normality of model residuals.  The Q-Q plot shows no significant 
violation of normal assumption since all points in this Q-Q plot locate very close to the 
normal reference line (solid line in this plot).  Further, a histogram of studentized 
residuals is plotted against the reference curve of normal PDF.  There is no significant 
inconsistency identified and T-test of mean residuals against zero is not statistically 
significant (t=-0.0009>tc.v.=-1.96).  Model 2 is free from violation of normality.  
Figure 5–6 depicts homoscedasticity assumption of regression error term.  The scatter 
plot of studentized residual vs. predicted performance index demonstrates a pattern of 
heterscedasticity.  Variance of residuals increases with larger and larger predicted values 
of performance index.  The spread-level plot in the right panel of Figure 5–6 suggest a 
power transformation of dependent variable to be Y0.9, which is almost identical to its 
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original linear form used in Model 2.  Since there is no useful power transformation of 
the dependent variable to solve this non-constant variance problem, robust standard errors 
will be calculated to make statistical inferences more valid.  
 
 
Figure 5–5 Checking normality with cumulative and density distribution plots of studentized residuals 
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Figure 5–6 Checking non-constant error variance (heteroscedasticity) 
 
5.6.3 Diagnostics of obligation model 
 
Figure 5–7 identifies case #228 to be the most influential outlier and this case will be 
excluded.  Figure 5–8 and Figure 5–9 confirm that residuals of Model 3 follow a normal 
distribution with mean of zero.  But variance of residuals is not constant.  Variance of 
error term gets larger when predicted performance index increases.  The suggested power 
transformation of dependent variable is Y0.9, which is almost identical to its linear form 
used in Model 3.  Therefore, the only solution left is to calculate robust standard error.  
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Figure 5–7 Cook’s Plot and Influence Plot for observation with largest Cook’s distance 
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Figure 5–8 Checking normality with cumulative and density distribution plots of studentized residuals 
 
 
Figure 5–9 Checking non-constant error variance (heteroscedasticity) 
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To sum up, model diagnostics suggest that case #167 should be excluded from Model 1; 
case #165 and #304 should be excluded from Model 2; and case #228 should be excluded 
from Model 3.  And standard errors of all three models in Table 5–10 must be replaced 
with robust standard errors.   
After doing so, Table 5–11 presents the most valid empirical supports to my relational 
hypotheses of guanxi effects on performance.  Model 1 in Table 5–11 supports RH-1. 
Comparing to similar SMEs with lower-than-median particularism, SMEs with high level 
of particularism perform significantly better (0.137, p<0.05) and this conclusion is a 
causal conclusion and this OLS model is not suffering from outlier influence and other 
assumption violations.  Similarly, Model 2 in Table 5–11 confirms the causal effect of 
multiplexity on performance and supports RH-2.  Comparing to similar SMEs that are 
low in multiplexity, SMEs with median and higher-than-median level of multiplexity 
perform significantly better (0.271, p<0.001).  Finally, Model 3 supports RH-3. 
Comparing to similar SMEs, SMEs with higher level of obligation perform significantly 
better (0.155, p<0.05).  
A comparison of models in Table 5–10 and Table 5–11 shows that after excluding most 
influential outliers, the model goodness-of-fit measured by adjusted-R-squared increases.  
Adjusted-R-squared for Model 1 increases from 0.479 to 0.494.  This fit statistic also 
increases from 0.523 to 0.534 for Model 2 and from 0.465 to 0.475 for Model 3, 
respectively.  Besides, robust standard errors tend to be bigger than standard errors 
calculated with classic OLS method, which makes hypothesis testing more conservative.  
Three relational hypothesis remain significant using larger standard errors, which further 
strengthen my conclusions of guanxi-based corporate social capital effects on business 
performance.  
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Table 5–11 OLS regression models with robust standard errors for causal effects of three guanxi 
dimensions on SME performance index using propensity-score-matched data; most influential 
outliers removed; all control variables omitted from this table 
Performance Index (1) (2) (3) 
High in Particularism (Yes=1) 0.137*   
 (0.068)   
High in Multiplexity (Yes=1)  0.271***  
  (0.079)  
High in Obligation (Yes=1)   0.155* 
   (0.064) 
Adjusted R-square 0.494 0.534 0.475 
N 341a 323b 438c 
^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
abc Most influential outliers removed. Adjusted R-squares also increase due to outlier exclusions. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Discussions 
 
In this final chapter of the dissertation, I sum up the main findings from the statistical 
analysis of the survey, draw my conclusions in reference to the hypotheses proposed, and 
discuss the innovations, limitations, and implications of this study for future research. 
6.1 Summary of findings 
Using a survey of 830 Chinese SMEs in the Pearl River Delta Region, this study has been 
developed to examine the merits of non-relational and relational explanations of business 
performance, and the examinations of the causal effects of guanxi-based corporate social 
capital have been obtained through both OLS and counterfactual models.  The main 
findings in Chapters 4 and 5 are summarized as follows.  
 
Non-relational explanations of performance 
Non-relational theories of business performance treat an enterprise as an open system that 
is actively adapting to or passively shaped by its external environments.  Transaction cost 
theory explains performance by market environments.  As a factor score of local market 
environment, the measure of transaction cost shows no significant effect (p>0.05) on 
business performance.  Institutional theory, on the other hand, relates performance to 
legitimacy defined by institutional environments.  As a sum of three dichotomous 
indicators, the variable of institutional legitimacy is positively and significantly related to 
performance (0.121, p<0.001).  All other things equal, an SME equipped with an active 
Party’s branch, a union, and a worker’s congress at the same time yields 0.363 unit higher 
in performance index than a SME without any of these source of institutional legitimacy.  
Given the distribution of performance index, an increase of 0.363 is a large improvement.  
These results show that institutional legitimacy in China is highly politicized, reflecting 
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the nature and strong influence of an enduring Communist party-state regime despite a 
tremendous marketization process since 1978. 
 
Relational explanations of performance 
Relational explanations of business performance emphasize the productive features of 
three guanxi dimensions, i.e. particularism, multiplexity, and obligations.   
Effects of these three guanxi dimensions on business performance are tested via OLS 
models in Chapter 4.  The continuous measure of particularism shows a significant and 
positive effect (0.057, p<0.05 one-tailed) on performance.  Cutting this continuous 
measure at its median, the resulting dummy measure puts the SMEs into higher- or 
lower-particularism categories, and this measure is also positive and statistically 
significant for performance.  All other things equal, SMEs with a higher level of 
particularism tend to perform 0.144 (p<0.001) unit better in the performance index than 
their counterparts with a lower degree of particularism.  Next, the continuous measure of 
multiplexity shows significant and positive effect on performance (0.181, p<0.001).  
Cutting this continuous measure at its median, the multiplexity dummy is also a 
significant and positive predictor (0.257, p<0.001) of performance.  Finally, the 
continuous measure of obligation shows a positive and significant effect (0.068, p<0.01) 
on performance.  The dichotomous measure of obligation (again setting median as the 
cutting point) also shows a significant and positive effect on performance (0.128, 
p<0.05). 
Chapter 5 presents results of counterfactual models estimated to obtain the causal effects 
of endogenous guanxi measures.  Models using Doubly Robust Estimators, propensity-
score weighting, and propensity-score matching strategies consistently demonstrate the 
causal effects of the three dummy measures of guanxi on performance.  By excluding 
influential outliers and calculating robust standard errors, models using propensity-score 
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matched data show significant causal effects of particularism (0.137, p<0.05), 




Findings summarized above support the following conclusions on how each of the three 
dimensions of guanxi-based corporate social capital facilitates business performance in 
the Chinese context.  
 
6.2.1 Particularism 
Particularism is productive.  Social ties connecting a focal entrepreneur to his/her most 
important business partners are considered to be particular if both parties attach highly 
personalized sentiments and intimacy.  Strong ties with high-level particularism generate 
information advantages.  Insider-only business information is usually highly profitable 
and it only circulates among densely connected core members.  Particularism as a 
precondition to join the core and enjoy productive information is therefore an important 
reason of business performance.  Highly particular strong ties provide advantages of 
resource and influence as well.  Exclusive resources and strong interpersonal influence 
are largely defined as favors in Chinese business culture.  Usually, favors carry the 
potential to eventually get the business done.  Like the circulation of insider-only 
information, effective favor exchanges tend to happen within small core circles where 
network members are densely connected via particular strong ties.  Last but not least, 
particularism attaches strong interpersonal trust to business relations.  In a society with 
very low level of general trust, Chinese businesspersons depend heavily on preexisting 
interpersonal sentiments to effectively monitor opportunistic behaviors.  People 
connected via particular ties face more severe social sanctions and significantly heavier 
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emotional burdens to harm sentimental and intimate social connections due to 
opportunism.  Thus, in a highly dynamic and institutionally uncertainty Chinese 




Multiplexity increases performance.  Social ties carrying both business and non-business 
functions are defined as multiplexed ties.  In the perspective of structural embeddedness, 
multiplexity embeds interconnected parties into several social networks, each of which is 
established to fulfill a given function.  In the perspective of relational embeddedness, cost 
of breaking down a multiplexed tie tends to be higher than terminating a simplexed tie 
that focuses on only one specific function.  As a result, multiplexed ties intertwine the 
ego and his/her alters closely in several social contexts and promote long-term and stable 
relations.  Long-term and stable business relations boost business performance because of 
following two major reasons: (1) Frequent business transactions generate high-level 
trustworthiness based on sufficient past experience on partners’ business ethics and their 
capability to fulfill contracts.  (2) Repeated transactions generate mutual understanding of 
various business demands and visions, such as expected product quality, preferred 
delivery methods, effective negotiating channels and styles, potential innovations, 
roadmap of long-term business development, and etc.  This mutual understanding leads to 
highly tailored contracts, flexible payment and delivery arrangements, quick and effective 
responses to disputes, and well-informed strategic initiatives, all of which generate short-
term profits and long-term performance. 
 
6.2.3 Obligations 
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Obligations nourish performance.  Comparing to business giants, SMEs are more 
vulnerable to market fluctuations, opportunistic behaviors, and wrong decisions.  This is 
particularly true for Chinese SMEs.  Given institutionalized discriminations against 
private businesses in China’s top-down economic reform, commercial and policy loans 
via formal channels disproportionately support financial needs of state-owned enterprises.  
Once facing crises, Chinese SMEs have no choice but to mobilize resources via informal 
conduits.  Strong ties with socially coercive obligations to provide favors in time act as a 
safety net in this scenario.  These favors can be direct financial supports.  Comparing to 
high-cost and short-term borrowing from private capital and illegal underground banks, 
financial supports via strong-ties are provided as sentiment-rich favors between kin and 
pseudo-kin and usually carry low (or even no) interests and flexible repayment 
arrangements.  These favors can also be in forms other than financial credits.  
Entrepreneurs embedded in this safety net can expect to receive, for examples, favorable 
business orders, new marketing channels, low-price raw materials, instructions of 
technical know-hows, and other tacit knowledge.  All those financial and non-financial 
favors due to obligations in strong-ties shelter SMEs from unexpected impacts and ensure 
business surviving and performance.  
 
6.2.4 Guanxi as an isotopic social capital 
Facing the lack of formal financial supports, the lack of fair market competitions, and a 
lack of clear and enforceable legal regulations of business behaviors in the private sector, 
weak ties fail to provide sufficient resources and enough trust to sustain performance of 
Chinese SMEs.  Instead, Chinese SMEs mobilize resources and build up business ethics 
in their guanxi networks and increase their performance using guanxi-based corporate 
social capital.   
In China, guanxi-based corporate social capital acts as an isotopic substitution of weak-
tie corporate social capital.  First, guanxi-based corporate social capital enables 
  99 
entrepreneurs to mobilize diversified resources via strong ties.  Unlike strong ties in 
Western cultures, guanxi ties are strong ties that connect within and between kin and non-
kin contacts.  In daily social interactions, Chinese people follow the habitus to apply 
moral values and behavioral principles within the kinship networks (such as obligations 
to help each other, self-sacrifice, and unconditional trust) to non-kin contacts who are 
perceived to be emotionally and/or instrumentally important.  By doing so in a 
differential association culture (Fei, 1992), Chinese people establish pseudo-kin relations 
and expand the scope of strong-tie networks to cover highly diversified non-blood 
network members.  Second, guanxi-based corporate social capital excavates instrumental 
values of strong ties.  Usually, guanxi ties are multiplexed strong ties that penetrate social 
spheres.  Including guanxi contacts into business and non-business networks is a common 
practice of Chinese entrepreneurs.  By doing so, strong ties can be used to fulfill both 
emotional and instrumental functions.  Third, guanxi-based corporate social capital 
promotes commitments to reciprocal and long-term favor exchanges.  A received favor 
does not need to and usually will not be repaid immediately.  Instead, favor providers 
expect gradual repayments in a relatively long period of time, maybe several months but 
usually years.  And a favor usually will not be repaid in the same kind: A favorable 
business order can be later repaid as detailed technology know-how; an emergency 
financial help can be repaid as low-price raw materials; and a new marketing channel will 
later be repaid by an exclusive investment opportunity.  Such a heterogeneous nature of 
favor exchanges drastically diversifies network resource flows and makes guanxi ties less 
prone to the disadvantage of redundancy.  
 
6.3 Discussions 
As a first attempt to study how dimensions of guanxi-based corporate social capital 
causally determine business performance, I have made theoretical and methodological 
contributions to the research of social capital and guanxi, although my efforts are not free 
from limitations of measurements and modeling strategy. 
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6.3.1 Contributions 
This study contributes to social capital theory.  In this study, Chinese guanxi is 
conceptualized as an isotope of weak-tie-based social capital, and the productive features 
of its three analytical dimensions (namely, particularism, multiplexity, and reciprocal 
obligation) are discussed in reference to both a long tradition of guanxi research and the 
fast changing Chinese economy.  By doing so, this study directly challenges the belief in 
the universal effectiveness of weak-tie social capital.  Interviews and quantitative models 
show that Chinese entrepreneurs enable effective resource mobilizations and enforce 
proper business ethics via particular, multifunctional, and reciprocal strong ties for favor 
exchanges.  Such a guanxi-based corporate social capital enriches our theoretical 
understanding of the cultural and social contingencies of social capital. 
In addition, this study makes two methodological contributions.  First, it measures 
attributes of guanxi ties using name generator, which captures existence, strength, 
quality, and moral values of guanxi ties between a focal entrepreneur and his/her three 
most important business partners.  By doing so, this study addresses the methodological 
concern identified by Chen et al (2013) on the lack of guanxi research that uses standard 
network methods to quantitatively measure guanxi tie attributes.  Measuring guanxi ties 
with name generator enables my study to investigate analytical dimensions of guanxi, 
which go beyond previous research that measures guanxi by frequencies of social 
networking activities (e.g. Gao, Xu, & Yang, 2008; Peng & Luo, 2000) and by costs to 
build and maintain guanxi (e.g. Y. Luo & Chen, 1997).  The second methodological 
contribution is to evaluate causal effect of each dimension of guanxi-based corporate 
social capital on performance.  Derived from four counterfactual models, my results 
forcefully demonstrate the existence of causal effects of guanxi on performance, free of 
the endogenous problems that are associated with social capital research in general (see 
(Mouw, 2003) for a critique) and Chinese guanxi studies in particular (see (Chen et al., 
2013) for a most recent review).  
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6.3.2 Limitation of measurements 
Performance.  Because of missing values, three out of five measures of business 
performance are selected to construct a factor score of performance index.  Compared to 
three selected indicators of total employees, fix assets, and annual tax, another two 
indicators of total sales and before-tax profit are more direct measures of performance.  
But total sales and before-tax profit were sensitive in the Chinese context and the survey 
used in this study had a majority of SMEs failed to provide answers.  How to reliably 
measure revenue and profit of Chinese enterprises is a question that calls for attention 
from future researchers.  
Multiplexity.  In this research, multiplexity is defined as the overlapping of business and 
non-business functions provided by a social tie.  This definition of multiplexity helps to 
answer why guanxi ties carrying business and non-business functions are productive.  In 
daily business practice, however, multiplexity also refers to the overlapping of different 
business functions provided by a given social tie.  That is to say, some business partners 
appear repeatedly in different business networks, such as networks of marketing, 
financing, information exchanging, and board interlocking.  Multiplexity spanning 
business and social spheres and multiplexity within the business world could benefit and 
constrain entrepreneurs in different ways.  In future research, questions capturing both 
types of multiplexity are needed to investigate such an important difference.  
 
6.3.3 Limitations of counterfactual models 
To solve the endogeneity problem of social capital measures, four analytical strategies in 
the counterfactual framework are conducted.  This is a major methodological contribution 
to quantitative studies of Chinese guanxi.  As a first attempt to analyze causal effects of 
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guanxi on performance, my modeling strategies are not free from limitations.  Three 
major limitations are discussed here.  
The first limitation is the lack of clear social meaning on dichotomizing continuous 
guanxi measures.  Instead of a theory-driven approach that identifies a critical cutting 
point, a data-driven approach is used.  When dichotomizing a continuous guanxi 
measure, I use its median as the cutting point so that the highest efficiency of propensity 
matching can be achieved.  Median cuts a continuous distribution into two equal halves.  
Using median as the cutting point guarantees that observed treatment assignment status is 
balanced before propensity matching.  This feature makes the matching algorithm 
generate a matched data with the largest sample size.  If other cutting points were used, 
more cases would be excluded from the matched data.  Take cutting point of 75-
percentile as an example.  This way of dichotomization generates a highly unbalanced 
distribution of observed treatment assignments: 25% of cases in the treatment group and 
75% of cases in the control group.  This strategy would generate 25% of cases in the 
treatment group and 25% of matched cases in the control group, resulting in a much 
smaller analytic sample size.   
The second limitation of the counterfactual methods is its assumption that all 
confounders, interactions between confounders, and correct functional transformation of 
confounders are included in the selection model.  This assumption can be very 
unrealistic.  Confined to available data, 11 variables of attributes of enterprises and 
entrepreneurs are considered as confounders, all of which are theoretically and 
empirically related to performance and corporate social capital.  However, those 11 
variables are far from “all possible confounders” and we are never capable of measuring 
all confounders in any study.  In future guanxi studies, two sets of confounders should be 
measured in addition to enterprise and entrepreneur attributes covered in this research.  
Occupational experience of entrepreneurs before they established their current enterprises 
is needed.  In addition to that, personality, dispositions, values, and visions are highly 
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possible to affect business performance (See (Miner, 2002) for a complete review) and 
entrepreneurs’ aptitude and strategies of social networking.  
Finally, it is a technical problem to determine what kind of interactions and mathematical 
functions of confounders should enter the selection model.  This technical problem is 
partially solved in this research by using Generalized Boosted Models (GBMs) to predict 
propensity scores.  GBMs automatically include optimal transformations and interactions 
of confounders in the selection model, so that much more accurate propensity scores can 
be obtained.  Like other machine learning techniques, the GBM is a prediction model 
rather than an explanation model.  The GBM works as a black box and there is no way to 
see how confounders determine treatment assignments, even though social scientists 
usually want to know this underlying mechanism.  
 
6.4 Implications for Future Research 
As a pioneering study to integrate dimensions and productive features of Chinese guanxi 
into the social capital literature, my dissertation provides four important implications for 
future research.   
The first implication is about improving guanxi measurements.  In this study, attributes of 
guanxi ties are captured by name generator.  This measurement strategy is very 
promising.  It allows investigations of Chinese guanxi in an analytical way and enriches 
our vision of social capital diversity.  In future research, position generator and a possible 
combination of name and position generators are needed to deepen our understanding of 
how guanxi facilitates resource mobility across social ladders and institutional boundaries 
(especially resource mobilizations across private and public sectors in China).  
The second implication is about guanxi effects in a mixed economy.  This study 
demonstrates productive features of guanxi on business performance of SMEs, most of 
which were privately owned.  In the foreseeable future, China’s reforms will 
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guided toward to maintaining the Communist party-state.  Therefore, the long-term 
coexistence of state and private sectors is a fundamental feature of Chinese mixed 
economy, and consequently the future research of guanxi-based corporate social capital 
will be more promising if a greater scope of Chinese enterprises, both state and nonstate 
enterprises, can be included in empirical examinations to show how guanxi facilitate 
smooth cooperation and harmonic coexistence of enterprises within and between 
economic sectors. 
The third implication is about the importance of enterprise-government guanxi ties.  This 
study concludes the importance of guanxi ties between entrepreneurs based on survey 
data collected in 2003.  Since 2003, domestic and international environments of China’s 
economic growth have changed greatly.  Among all macro-economic changes, we clearly 
observe increasing competitive advantages of giant state corporate players and a 
deepening penetration of foreign competitors to China’s markets.  China’s private SMEs 
are less likely to survive such challenges alone without policy supports from local and 
central government.  Future research, using new data from China, can generate more 
interesting findings by investigating the importance of private entrepreneurs’ guanxi ties 
to government officials.  
The last implication is further theoretical elaborations of isotopic corporate social capital 
via comparative research of business enterprises in Chinese and non-Chinese contexts.  
Isotopes of corporate social capital differ in configurations of relational, structural, and 
moral dimensions.  This study introduces a corporate social capital isotope based on 
Chinese guanxi and confirms its causal effects on business performance of SMEs.  The 
guanxi-based corporate social capital is clearly not the only isotope to boost business 
performance.  Other configurations of relational, structural, and moral dimensions are 
highly likely to form productive social capital isotopes for entrepreneurs in other cultural 
contexts.  Further empirical tests of this theoretical prediction using cross-cultural data 
will be helpful for identifying more contingencies of corporate social capital.  
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Appendix A Full Regression Tables in Chapter 5 
 
Table 5-1 Treatment effect models for causal effects of three guanxi dimensions on SME performance index 
Average Treatment Effects (ATE) (1) (2) (3) 
High in Particularism (Yes=1) 0.005   
 (0.652)   
High in Multiplexity (Yes=1)  0.420  
  (0.721)  
High in Obligation (Yes=1)   0.456 
   (0.540) 
Probit Selection Models Particularism  Multiplexity  Obligation  
 (High=1) (High =1) (High =1) 
Enterprise attributes    
Industries (Ref. = Furniture)    
Textile, dyeing, and finishing -0.351^ -0.549** 0.282 
 (0.187) (0.199) (0.176) 
Metal processing -0.565** -0.662** 0.359^ 
 (0.193) (0.207) (0.184) 
Fashion and garment -0.146 -0.159 0.300 
 (0.223) (0.242) (0.209) 
Ceramics -0.337 -0.490^ 0.403 
 (0.286) (0.294) (0.266) 
Building materials -0.467* -0.385 0.585* 
 (0.232) (0.266) (0.230) 
Established year (Ref. = 1979-1991)    
1992 – 1999 0.091 0.154 -0.296* 
 (0.144) (0.146) (0.144) 
2000 – 2003 0.343^ 0.145 -0.328^ 
 (0.184) (0.183) (0.176) 
Ownership (Ref. = Collective owned)    
Private/family owned -0.203 -0.096 0.966** 
 (0.401) (0.394) (0.363) 
FDI/Co.Ltd. -0.271 -0.075 1.007* 
 (0.422) (0.426) (0.395) 
Has any affiliated enterprise (Yes=1) 1.088*** 0.230 0.656** 
 (0.290) (0.239) (0.236) 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) -0.156 0.232 0.306 
 (0.231) (0.253) (0.244) 
% of employees with education above HS/VHS -0.002 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entrepreneur attributes    
Age (year) 0.067 0.042 -0.275 
 (0.221) (0.231) (0.223) 
Male (Yes=1) -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Years of schooling 0.007 0.049* 0.000 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Party membership (Yes=1) -0.262 -0.066 0.377* 
 (0.186) (0.193) (0.189) 
Job training experience (months) -0.001 0.001 -0.014* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Constant 0.936 0.722 -0.418 
 (0.637) (0.659) (0.615) 
Hyperbolic tangent of ] 0.133 -0.122 -0.321 
 (0.612) (0.678) (0.519) 
^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; N = 570 
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Table 5-2 Inverse-Probability-Weighted Regression Adjustment (IPWRA) models for causal effects of three 
guanxi dimensions on SME performance index 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
ATE ATT ATE ATT ATE ATT 
High in Particularism (Yes=1) 0.169** 0.190**     
 (0.060) (0.064)     
High in Multiplexity (Yes=1)   0.208** 0.188*   
   (0.075) (0.087)   
High in Obligation (Yes=1)     0.113* 0.112^ 
     (0.057) (0.062) 
Probit Selection Model Particularism Multiplexity Obligation 
 (High=1) (High =1) (High =1) 
Enterprise attributes    
Industries (Ref. = Furniture)       
Textile, dyeing, and finishing -0.352^ -0.352^ -0.543** -0.543** 0.277 0.277 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.195) (0.195) (0.173) (0.173) 
Metal processing -0.569** -0.569** -0.654** -0.654** 0.363* 0.363* 
 (0.191) (0.191) (0.202) (0.202) (0.180) (0.180) 
Fashion and garment -0.144 -0.144 -0.152 -0.152 0.291 0.291 
 (0.223) (0.223) (0.233) (0.233) (0.203) (0.203) 
Ceramics -0.351 -0.351 -0.475^ -0.475^ 0.405 0.405 
 (0.284) (0.284) (0.281) (0.281) (0.263) (0.263) 
Building materials -0.468* -0.468* -0.366 -0.366 0.588** 0.588** 
 (0.234) (0.234) (0.252) (0.252) (0.223) (0.223) 
Established year (Ref. = 1979-1991)       
1992 – 1999 0.091 0.091 0.152 0.152 -0.301* -0.301* 
 (0.144) (0.144) (0.147) (0.147) (0.143) (0.143) 
2000 – 2003 0.346^ 0.346^ 0.148 0.148 -0.328^ -0.328^ 
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.175) (0.175) (0.174) (0.174) 
Ownership (Ref. = Collective 
owned) 
      
Private/family owned -0.187 -0.187 -0.092 -0.092 0.961* 0.961* 
 (0.402) (0.402) (0.383) (0.383) (0.404) (0.404) 
FDI/Co.Ltd. -0.257 -0.257 -0.060 -0.060 0.981* 0.981* 
 (0.437) (0.437) (0.424) (0.424) (0.426) (0.426) 
Has any affiliated enterprise (Yes=1) 1.075*** 1.075*** 0.229 0.229 0.663** 0.663** 
 (0.263) (0.263) (0.225) (0.225) (0.240) (0.240) 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) -0.145 -0.145 0.238 0.238 0.273 0.273 
 (0.230) (0.230) (0.240) (0.240) (0.222) (0.222) 
% of employees with education 
above HS/VHS 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.004 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entrepreneur attributes       
Age (year) 0.064 0.064 0.047 0.047 -0.278 -0.278 
 (0.234) (0.234) (0.235) (0.235) (0.229) (0.229) 
Male (Yes=1) -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Years of schooling 0.006 0.006 0.050^ 0.050^ 0.001 0.001 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) 
Party membership (Yes=1) -0.266 -0.266 -0.066 -0.066 0.387* 0.387* 
 (0.187) (0.187) (0.196) (0.196) (0.189) (0.189) 
Job training experience (months) -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.014* -0.014* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 0.929 0.929 0.701 0.701 -0.388 -0.388 
 (0.660) (0.660) (0.648) (0.648) (0.633) (0.633) 
^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; N = 570 
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Table 5-3 Propensity-score-weighted regression models for causal effects of three guanxi dimensions on SME 
performance index 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
ATE ATT ATE ATT ATE ATT 
High in Particularism 
(Yes=1) 
0.142* 0.144*     
 (0.062) (0.062)     
High in Multiplexity (Yes=1)   0.275*** 0.275***   
   (0.067) (0.068)   
High in Obligation (Yes=1)     0.112* 0.118* 
     (0.057) (0.057) 
Institutional Legitimacy 0.095* 0.094* 0.102* 0.099* 0.102* 0.106** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.040) (0.041) 
Enterprise attributes       
Industries (Ref. = Furniture)       
Textile, dyeing, and 
finishing 
-0.259** -0.258** -0.300** -0.295** -0.301*** -0.281** 
(0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.083) (0.085) 
Metal processing -0.241** -0.231* -0.248** -0.237* -0.271** -0.259** 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.093) (0.083) (0.085) 
Fashion and garment -0.075 -0.074 -0.132 -0.130 -0.104 -0.095 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.111) (0.112) (0.099) (0.101) 
Ceramics 0.705*** 0.724*** 0.702*** 0.730*** 0.715*** 0.747*** 
 (0.164) (0.163) (0.175) (0.173) (0.150) (0.151) 
Building materials 0.046 0.041 -0.047 -0.038 0.016 0.013 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.114) 
Established year (Ref. = 1979-1991)      
1992 – 1999 -0.015 -0.021 0.003 0.009 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.078) (0.078) (0.075) (0.074) 
2000 – 2003 -0.100 -0.107 -0.130 -0.127 -0.063 -0.073 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.097) (0.098) (0.095) (0.095) 
Ownership (Ref. = Collective owned)      
Private/family owned 0.176 0.175 0.038 0.040 0.017 0.026 
 (0.198) (0.197) (0.188) (0.189) (0.196) (0.200) 
FDI/Co.Ltd. 0.615** 0.621** 0.429* 0.441* 0.421^ 0.432^ 
 (0.211) (0.209) (0.206) (0.206) (0.216) (0.220) 
Has any affiliated enterprise 
(Yes=1) 
0.205^ 0.211^ 0.253* 0.253* 0.295* 0.290* 
(0.121) (0.120) (0.118) (0.117) (0.119) (0.118) 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) 0.584*** 0.567*** 0.469** 0.455** 0.555*** 0.538*** 
 (0.130) (0.129) (0.147) (0.147) (0.131) (0.130) 
% of employees with 
education above HS/VHS 
0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entrepreneur attributes       
Age (year) 0.224* 0.228* 0.147 0.148 0.205* 0.201* 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.109) (0.108) (0.098) (0.098) 
Male (Yes=1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Years of schooling 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.018 0.019 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Party membership (Yes=1) 0.325** 0.328** 0.328*** 0.332*** 0.284** 0.284** 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.097) (0.097) (0.094) (0.093) 
Job training experience 
(months) 
0.007* 0.007^ 0.007^ 0.007* 0.007* 0.007^ 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -0.954** -0.952** -0.766* -0.761* -0.782* -0.815** 
 (0.328) (0.328) (0.322) (0.322) (0.305) (0.310) 
Adjusted R-square 0.473 0.472 0.514 0.518 0.479 0.480 
^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; N = 570 
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Table 5-10 OLS regression models for causal effects of three guanxi dimensions on SME performance index 
using propensity-score-matched data (nearest-neighbor matching with clippers = n. op×q.r. stuvwx ) 
Average Treatment Effects (1) (2) (3) 
High in Particularism (Yes=1) 0.142*   
 (0.070)   
High in Multiplexity (Yes=1)  0.285***  
  (0.078)  
High in Obligation (Yes=1)   0.157* 
   (0.066) 
Institutional Legitimacy 0.079^ 0.112* 0.119** 
 (0.047) (0.054) (0.044) 
Enterprise attributes    
Industries (Ref. = Furniture)    
Textile, dyeing, and finishing -0.301* -0.403** -0.310** 
 (0.117) (0.133) (0.106) 
Metal processing -0.181 -0.335* -0.244* 
 (0.117) (0.136) (0.108) 
Fashion and garment -0.043 -0.108 -0.170 
 (0.149) (0.160) (0.123) 
Ceramics 0.838*** 0.730*** 0.736*** 
 (0.176) (0.186) (0.155) 
Building materials 0.202 -0.081 -0.002 
 (0.145) (0.165) (0.136) 
Established year (Ref. = 1979-1991)    
1992 – 1999 -0.071 -0.074 0.058 
 (0.086) (0.091) (0.084) 
2000 – 2003 -0.122 -0.226* -0.016 
 (0.106) (0.113) (0.106) 
Ownership (Ref. = Collective owned)    
Private/family owned 0.196 0.043 0.072 
 (0.261) (0.237) (0.215) 
FDI/Co.Ltd. 0.615* 0.173 0.471* 
 (0.270) (0.257) (0.229) 
Has any affiliated enterprise (Yes=1) -0.086 0.452** 0.335* 
 (0.216) (0.165) (0.140) 
Is Longtou enterprise (Yes=1) 0.627*** 0.380* 0.448*** 
 (0.127) (0.168) (0.132) 
% of employees with education above HS/VHS 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entrepreneur attributes    
Age (year) 0.232^ 0.077 0.077 
 (0.126) (0.144) (0.133) 
Male (Yes=1) -0.000 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Years of schooling 0.006 -0.003 0.015 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) 
Party membership (Yes=1) 0.242* 0.284* 0.340** 
 (0.114) (0.125) (0.120) 
Job training experience (months) 0.009* 0.012* 0.007^ 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant -0.829* -0.295 -0.688^ 
 (0.390) (0.412) (0.365) 
Adjusted R-square 0.479 0.523 0.465 
N 342 325 439 
^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Appendix B Simplified Mathematical Proofing of Doubly-robust Estimation 
(DRE)29 
DRE defines ATE as the difference between two propensity-score-weighted averaged 
outcomes:	 
 ∆ycz= *_8 !656j %6, H − 56 − j %6, Hj %6, H L8l6m8− *_8 !6 1 − 561 − j %6, H − 56 − j %6, H1 − j %6, H L:l6m8 	= >8,ycz − >:,ycz 
 
where n is sample size, Y is the dependent variable; w is the treatment assignment, j %6, H  is the estimated propensity score; L8 represents Equation 5-5 when 56 = 1; and L: represents Equation 5-5 when 56 = 0.  
 
Due to the Law of Large Numbers:  
 < >8,ycz = < !5j %, H − 5 − j %, Hj %, H L8 	= < !85j %, H − 5 − j %, Hj %, H L8 	= < !8 + 5 − j %, Hj %, H !8 − L8 	
                                                
29	This simplified mathematical proofing is based on following contributions: 
Lunceford, J., and Davidian, M., 2004, “Stratification and Weighting via the Propensity 
Score in Estimation of Causal Treatment Effects: A Comparative Study”, Statistics in 
Medicine, 23, 2937-2960. 
Tan, Z., 2010, “Bounded, Efficient and Doubly Robust Estimation with Inverse 
Weighting”, Biometrika, 97(3), 661-682. 
Funk, M., Westreich, D., Wiesen, C., Stürmer, T., Brookhart, M., and Davidian, M., 
2011, “Doubly Robust Estimation of Causal Effects”, American Journal of 
Epidemiology, 173(7), 761-767. 
Słoczyński, T., and Wooldridge, J., 2014, “A General Double Robustness Result for 
Estimating Average Treatment Effects”, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 
Discussion Paper No. 8084.	
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= < !8 + < 5 − j %, Hj %, H !8 − L8  
 
If the OLS outcome model is correctly specified but the selection model is subject to 
misspecifications, then we have L8 = < !|5 = 1, % = < !8|%  and the second term in 
above equation is zero because: < 5 − j %, Hj %, H !8 − L8 = < 5 − j %, Hj %, H !8 − < !|5 = 1, % 	= < 5 − j %, Hj %, H !8 − < !|5 = 1, % 5, % 	= < 5 − j %, Hj %, H < !8 − < !|5 = 1, % |5, % 	
= < 5 − j %, Hj %, H < !8|5, % − < !|5 = 1, % 	
= < 5 − j %, Hj %, H < !8|% − < !8|%h{6g	|}~h	6g	Ä~d = 0 
 
That is to say that as long as the outcome model is correctly specified, the >8,ycz is a 
consistent estimator of < !8  even if the selection model is not correctly specified. 
Similar logic leads to the conclusion that >:,ycz is a consistent estimator of < !: . 
Combining those two conclusions together, ∆ycz is a consistent estimator of the 
population parameter of ATE. 
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Appendix C Background Attributes of Enterprises and Entrepreneurs Used in 
Estimating Propensity Scores with Generalized Boosted Models 
 
Predicting variables used in GBMs for each guanxi dimension measure 
Guanxi dimensions Predicting variables in GBM 
Particularism 
• Attributes of enterprises 
o Has affiliated enterprise 
o Is Longtou enterprise  
o % of employees with high/vocational school degrees 
• Attributes of entrepreneurs 
o Age in 2003 
o Years of schooling  
o Job training experience 
Multiplexity 
• Attributes of enterprises 
o Has affiliated enterprise  
o Is Longtou enterprise  
o % of employees with high/vocational school degrees 
• Attributes of entrepreneurs 
o Age in 2003 
o Years of schooling 
o Party membership  
o Job training experience 
Obligations 
• Attributes of enterprises 
o Has affiliated enterprise  
o % of employees with high/vocational school degrees  
• Attributes of entrepreneurs 
o Age in 2003 
o Years of schooling  
o Party membership  
o Job training experience 
* Variables in each GBM have influence greater than 2%.  
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Appendix D Propensity-score Weighting Scheme 
 
A scheme of using estimated propensity score as sampling weights for average treatment effect 
(ATE) and average treatment effect on treated (ATT) 
Observed treatment assignment Average treatment effect  (ATE) 
Average treatment effect on treated 
(ATT) 
Cases in treatment group 1/ps 1 
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Appendix E Summary Statistics of Propensity-score Weights  
 
Propensity weights Mean S.D. Min Max 
ATE* of particularism 1.964 0.739 1.289 3.992 
ATT** of particularism 1.322 0.496 0.976 2.992 
ATE of multiplexity 1.911 0.861 1.216 5.278 
ATT of multiplexity 1.335 0.613 0.834 4.278 
ATE of obligation 1.944 0.247 1.451 2.725 
ATT of obligation 1.036 0.167 0.451 1.725 
Note: N = 816; * ATE = Average Treatment Effect;  
** ATT = Average Treatment Effect for the Treated 
 
 
 
